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ARTICLE
Lonnie T. Brown, Jr.
Civility and Collegiality—Unreasonable Judicial
Expectations for Lawyers As Officers of the Court?
Abstract. It is a well-settled and often-recited fact that lawyers are “officers
of the court.” That title, however, is notoriously hortatory and devoid of
meaning. Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit recently took the somewhat
unprecedented step of utilizing the officer-of-the-court label to, in effect,
sanction an attorney for the purportedly uncivil act of failing to provide
defendant attorneys with pre-suit notice. While the author applauds the
court’s desire to place greater emphasis on lawyer-to-lawyer collegiality as a
component of officer-of-the-court status, the uncertainty the decision creates
in terms of a lawyer’s role will potentially force litigators to compromise
important client-centered duties. This Article argues that it would be
preferable for courts to define sanctionable officer-of-the-court duties by
reference to well-defined, existing procedural and ethical norms, thereby
enhancing predictability and imbuing the label with much-needed substance.
Author. Professor of Law and A. Gus Cleveland Distinguished Chair of
Legal Ethics and Professionalism, University of Georgia School of Law; J.D.,
Vanderbilt University; B.A., Emory University. The author is grateful to
Professors Donald E. Campbell, C. Ronald Ellington, and Eugene R. Gaetke
for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. The author also thanks
Micah Engler and Amanda Powell for invaluable editorial and research
assistance. Finally, the author, most importantly, thanks his wife Kim for her
steadfast encouragement and perceptive observations throughout this Article’s
development.
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I. INTRODUCTION
We believe and defend the idea that maintaining a bar that promotes
civility and collegiality is in the public interest and greatly advances judicial
efficiency: better “to secure the just, speedy[,] and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding,” as Rule 1 demands.1

Incivility and discourtesy among lawyers—litigators in particular—have
become perhaps the most popular sources of complaint and dissatisfaction
for members of the bar.2 Indeed, hardball strategies and unpalatable
theatrics are increasingly viewed as the norm rather than the exception.3
Furthermore, while lawyers who engage in such behavior no doubt believe

1. Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L. (Sahyers I), 560 F.3d 1241, 1244 n.5 (11th
Cir. 2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010). The author of this
quote, Judge Edmondson, also saw fit to include it in his opinion accompanying the denial of a
request for rehearing en banc in the case. Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L. (Sahyers II),
603 F.3d 888, 891 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Edmondson, J., concurring).
2. See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Deloitte & Touche, 501 N.W.2d 15, 19–20 (Wis. 1993)
(“There is a perception both inside and outside the legal community that civility, candor, and
professionalism are on the decline in the legal profession and that unethical, win-at-all-costs,
scorched-earth tactics are on the rise.”); INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVILITY OF
THE SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, 143 F.R.D. 371, 375 (1991) (“We learned there is
widespread dissatisfaction among judges and lawyers at the gradual changing of the practice of law
from an occupation characterized by congenial professional relationships to one of abrasive
confrontations.”); NANCY LEVIT & DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A GOOD
LIFE IN THE LAW 58 (2010) (remarking that one of the largest sources of discontent for lawyers is the
incivility of other lawyers because the practice is rampant); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS
OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 11 (2000) (observing that “[m]ost practitioners
are unhappy with regulatory structures and with the incivility, hucksterism, and other misconduct
that they seem powerless to prevent”); Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to be
Civil: Defining Civility As an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 100
(2011/2012) (maintaining that “the need to reclaim ‘civility’ in the practice of law has become a
rallying cry in the profession”); Amy R. Mashburn, Making Civility Democratic, 47 HOUS. L. REV.
1147, 1157 (2011) (noting the litigation climate “is perceived by most commentators to have
continued to worsen, and lawyers and judges continue to complain of growing incivility”).
3. See NANCY LEVIT & DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A GOOD LIFE
IN THE LAW 59 (2010) (discussing two polls indicating that “69[%] of lawyers thought that civility
in the profession had declined over time, and 80[%] of judges had observed uncivil attorney conduct
in their courtrooms”). In a recent article, Susan Daicoff stated:
The vast majority of commentators generally agree that the level of “professionalism” displayed
by attorneys has declined dramatically in the last twenty-five years . . . [as evidenced by] a
decline in civility and courteous conduct between lawyers, an increase in unethical or uncivil
behavior among lawyers and judges, frequent lapses of appropriate ethical and professional
conduct, and increasingly aggressive, competitive, and money-oriented legal battles, fought with
a “win at all costs” approach . . . .
Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on
Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1344 (1997).
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that their “Rambo” tactics are effective for and desired by their clients,4
the resulting negative impact on judicial efficiency is undeniable.5
Consequently, the active promotion of the contrary ideals of civility and
collegiality should be a welcomed initiative, right?
In the abstract, the answer is surely “yes.” However, when one considers
the source of the statement of principle quoted above,6 as well as the
specific circumstances that underlie its pronouncement, wholehearted
endorsement becomes a more complicated proposition. The quote is from
Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L.,7 in which the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed a district court’s refusal to award a plaintiff mandatory
attorney’s fees. Specifically, the court found that the district court had
properly exercised its inherent authority because plaintiff’s counsel had
“made absolutely no effort . . . to inform [defendants] of [p]laintiff’s
impending claim much less to resolve [the] dispute before filing suit.”8
The genesis of this obligation in Sahyers was ostensibly a concern for
“lawyer-to-lawyer collegiality and civility.”9 In particular, the defendants
happened to be lawyers, and in the court’s view, suing fellow members of
the bar without first affording them notice and an opportunity to respond
4. See NANCY LEVIT & DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A GOOD LIFE
LAW 59 (2010) (observing that “[s]ome lawyers perceive that playing hardball brings a
strategic advantage”); Bronson D. Bills, To Be or Not to Be: Civility and the Young Lawyer, 5 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 31, 35–36 (2005) (“[T]oday many [lawyers] avow that civility is anachronistic or
incompatible with the modern day practice of law . . . . Some equate acting civilly with being a ‘push
over,’ being ‘faint of heart,’ and ‘weak,’ while others proclaim that the only way to successfully litigate
is through the use of aggressive and belligerent tactics.” (footnotes omitted)); Shawn Collins, Be
Civil? I’m a Litigator!, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 20, 1999, at 21, 21 (arguing that being an effective advocate
requires the opposite of civility).
5. See FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, 143 F.R.D. 441, 445 (1992) (observing that “[a] lack of civility can escalate
clients’ litigation costs while failing to advance their interests or bring them closer to their ultimate
goal of ending disputes. Time expended in ‘Rambo’-style discovery can hinder or prevent litigation
parties from getting to the heart of the important contested issues.”); Marvin E. Aspen, Be Careful
How You Tread, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 15, 1999, at 16, 16 (asserting that “[c]onduct that may be
characterized as uncivil, abrasive, abusive, hostile or obstructive impedes the fundamental goal of
resolving disputes rationally, peacefully[,] and efficiently”); see also Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo
Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 637 (1990) (remarking
that experienced lawyers generally agree that use of Rambo tactics should be discouraged).
6. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1244 n.5 (“We believe and defend the idea that maintaining a bar
that promotes civility and collegiality is in the public interest and greatly advances judicial efficiency:
better to ‘secure the just, speedy[,] and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding,’ as
Rule 1 demands.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)).
7. Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L. (Sahyers I), 560 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010).
8. Id. at 1245.
9. Id.
IN THE
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was neither collegial nor civil. To make matters worse, plaintiff’s counsel’s
lack of civility was not simply deemed an affront to his colleagues within
the bar, as the court also stated that it “caused . . . the judiciary to waste
significant time and resources on unnecessary litigation and stood in stark
contrast to the behavior expected of an officer of the court.”10
While Sahyers was undoubtedly intended to send a strong
professionalism message to plaintiff’s counsel individually,11 the decision’s
underlying reasoning cannot be so easily quarantined. Rather, it is readily
transferable to other litigation scenarios, which, at a minimum, creates the
lingering possibility that pre-suit notice, or some other court-created
obligation, could conceivably be required in all manner of cases. As a
result, Sahyers might very well be a harbinger for enhanced use of the
officer-of-the-court mantra in the name of civility, collegiality, and judicial
efficiency.12
Admittedly, greater emphasis on attorneys’ professional obligations as
officers of the court should redound to the collective benefit of the legal
system and the profession. The problem with such a strategy, however, is
the uncertain and malleable nature of these obligations.13 More precisely,
the officer-of-the-court label is frequently summoned by courts when they
perceive that something more should be expected of an attorney than the
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. The Eleventh Circuit attempted to circumscribe its decision by stating that the decision was
fact-intensive. See id. at 1246 (“We strongly caution against inferring too much from our decision
today. These kinds of decisions are fact-intensive.”).
12. See infra Part V.C (describing the effects of utilizing a vague officer-of-the-court standard);
cf. Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility As an
Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 101 (2011–12) (discussing Sahyers as
an example of the “increasing willingness of courts to sanction lawyers based solely on a lack of
‘civility’”).
Another case in which a court recognized an unwritten and unforeseeable
officer-of-the-court duty seemingly contrary to a lawyer’s client-centered obligations is Smith v.
Johnston. Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1263–64 (Ind. 1999) (holding that lawyers’ duties
arise not only out of ethical rules but also from the fact that every lawyer is an officer of the court).
13. See George A. Riemer, Officers of the Court: What Does it Mean?, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug.–
Sept. 2001, at 27, 27 (contending that the officer-of-the-court label “is very ambiguous in meaning
and gets in the way of understanding the source and scope of the ethical duties of lawyers” (citing 37
Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 1251 (1976))); infra Part V.B (discussing various perspectives on the meaning of
officer of the court); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV.
39, 77 (1989) (observing that the conflict between a lawyer’s role as an officer of the court and the
more definitive zealous advocacy duty “creates confusion and cynicism within the bar” (citing Heinz
& Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH.
L. REV. 1111, 1140 (1978); E. Wayne Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to Report Other
Lawyers’ Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 95, 100)). See generally
James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer of the Court”, 48 BUFF.
L. REV. 349 (2000) (providing a thoughtful critique on the confusion generated by the officer-of-thecourt title).
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behavior exhibited, and as Sahyers vividly indicates, judicial perceptions in
this regard can vary depending upon the disposition of the
decision-maker.14
Although creating and enforcing professional duties in an ad hoc fashion
might serve to keep lawyers on their ethical toes, the lack of predictability
would, in the long run, unduly hamstring their ability to fulfill legitimate
duties owed to clients. Accordingly, this Article proposes a compromise
that can achieve the intangible benefits that flow from an aspirational
officer-of-the-court standard without the debilitating unpredictability.
Namely, courts should exalt lawyers to live up to their higher,
officer-of-the-court calling at appropriate times. But to be valid, those
instances should be directly traceable to well-defined, existing procedural
or ethical norms.
Part II lays the foundation for this proposal through a detailed analysis
of the three stages of the Sahyers litigation: (1) the trial court’s initial
decision;15 (2) the affirmance on appeal by the three-judge panel of the
Eleventh Circuit;16 and (3) the denial of plaintiff’s request for a rehearing
en banc.17 Each phase of the case exposes varying perspectives on the
significance of the officer-of-the-court aspect of a lawyer’s role and its
relationship to client-centered obligations.
Part III then closely explores the Eleventh Circuit panel’s tenuous legal
reasoning and reveals that it may portend far wider application than the
court contemplated. Specifically, the broad tenets of civility, judicial
economy, and officer-of-the-court status transcend all litigation settings.
Therefore, that professional station can be invoked by courts at-will, in the
exercise of their inherent authority, to create pre-suit notice or other

14. See Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility As
an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 142 (2011–12) (“The legal
profession is not well-served if civility continues to be a term whose meaning exists only in the eye of
the beholder or whose tenets create obligations that are inconsistent with a lawyer’s preexisting
professional obligations.”); infra Part II.C (discussing the concurring and dissenting opinions of
Sahyers II). Compare Smith, 711 N.E.2d at 1261–62 (setting aside a default judgment based on
plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to provide defense counsel with advance notice), with Sprung v. Negwer
Materials, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 97, 100–01, 109 (Mo. 1989) (refusing to set aside a default judgment
based on plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to advise defense counsel of the entry of a default judgment
during the time within which that judgment would likely have been set aside as a matter of course),
superseded by MO. R. CIV. P. 74.05, as recognized in Cont’l Basketball Ass’n v. Harrisburg Prof’l
Sports Inc., 947 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
15. Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L., No. 8:07-cv-52-T-30MAP, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 112849 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2008).
16. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1246.
17. Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 889 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Edmondson, J., concurring).

BROWN_FINAL

330

6/26/2012 11:51 AM

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 2:324

unwritten duties.18
Part IV proceeds to test the validity of the rationale underlying the
Eleventh Circuit’s recognition of the notice obligation by comparing it to
the bases for the widely-adopted formal pre-suit notice requirement in
medical malpractice actions. As Part IV demonstrates, the common
foundational thread that runs through both sets of pre-filing notification
directives is the desire for enhanced judicial efficiency.19 While this
commonality seemingly bolsters the propriety of the Sahyerss pre-suit
notice duty, the court’s approval of the ex post imposition of this
requirement still raises unpredictability concerns not present in the clearly
articulated medical malpractice notice scheme.
Part V continues with an examination of the origins, evolution, and
uncertain meaning of the officer-of-the-court label in America. It then
analyzes the potential effects of judges utilizing an imprecise
officer-of-the-court model to create and enforce general behavioral norms
within the profession and concludes that although some benefits would
likely flow from this approach, it is more probable that it will foster overcautiousness on the part of litigators, chilling even legitimate zealous
advocacy.
In light of this, Part VI proposes, as an alternative, that courts place
increased emphasis on the procedural and ethical proscriptions that
currently exist for constraining excessive zeal and other forms of
illegitimate advocacy, and tie those directly to the officer-of-the-court
characterization, a tactic that some courts have already employed.20 Such
18. But see Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (recognizing the broad inherent
authority of federal courts but emphasizing that courts invoking this power must “exercise
caution . . . and . . . comply with the mandates of due process”).
19. See, e.g., Rabatin v. Kidd, 281 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.)
(describing the legislative intent of the notice requirement for medical liability actions as an incentive
to reduce litigation costs and encourage settlement (citing State v. Sanchez, 135 S.W.3d 698, 699
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2003), aff’d, 138 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004))).
20. These courts determined that the behavior of the attorneys in question fell below certain
defined norms for the profession, categorized as officer-of-the-court duties, namely, the dictates of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 30, and 37, as well as various standards contained in the
governing Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 8.4. See GMAC
Bank v. HTFC Corp., 252 F.R.D. 253, 256–57 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (relying upon the Pennsylvania
Rules of Professional Conduct and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to sanction a lawyer for
abusive behavior); Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 98 CIV 10175(JSM), 2002 WL
59434, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002) (linking Rule 11 with an attorney’s officer-of-the-court
duties); see also Amy R. Mashburn, Making Civility Democratic, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1147, 1163
(2011) (reporting results of an empirical study of cases over a ten-year period addressing uncivil
behavior by lawyers, which revealed that “judges and disciplinary tribunals make reference to, and
rely upon, a variety of legal provisions as sources of their authority to impose sanctions or penalties
for incivility, discourteousness, and disrespect”); cf. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 61–72 (Kennedy, J.,
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a measured, transparent approach can serve to rein in uncivil and
uncollegial behavior,21 while simultaneously adding important substance
to the ill-defined officer-of-the-court ideal, which, in turn, will further the
ultimate objective of making attorneys more cognizant of this critically
important facet of their professional responsibility.22
II. SAHYERS V. PRUGH, HOLLIDAY & KARATINOS, P.L.
A. District Court’s Decision
Plaintiff Christine Sahyers worked as a paralegal for the law firm of
Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos.23 After leaving her position, she retained
counsel and filed suit against the firm and its named partners under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),24 contending that they had failed to
properly compensate her for overtime work in violation of the Act.25
Specifically, she maintained that defendants did not pay her at least 1.5
times her standard hourly rate for hours worked in excess of her normal
forty-hour workweek, as required by the FLSA.26 Notably, Sahyers’s
counsel did not make a pre-filing demand on the defendants, nor did he
make any attempt to inform them about Sahyers’s claim.27 Sahyers had
expressly instructed her counsel simply to file the lawsuit, and he followed
her instructions.28

dissenting) (arguing that the lower court’s imposition of sanction solely pursuant to its inherent
authority was not proper, given the existence of various statutes and rules of procedure that covered
the misconduct in question).
21. See Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility As
an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 145–46 (2011–12) (arguing for the
necessity of specificity in identifying particular civility-based obligations).
22. In his comprehensive and authoritative treatment of the subject, Professor Eugene R.
Gaetke exposed the definitional and substantive inadequacies of the officer-of-the-court designation.
Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 40–48 (1989). His
primary mode of analysis consisted of a thoughtful examination of the then extant ethical rules and
non-disciplinary obligations that could be categorized as officer-of-the-court duties. Id. at 48–76.
This analysis led him to conclude that the profession either needed to abandon use of the
officer-of-the-court description or else imbue the phrase with true meaning by adopting clear rules of
professional conduct that affirmatively subordinate the interests of lawyers and their clients to those
of the legal system and the public. Id. at 90–91. Adoption of Professor Gaetke’s position would
enhance the operation of the approach endorsed in this Article by expanding the obligations that are
clearly identifiable as falling under the officer-of-the-court rubric.
23. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010).
24. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2006).
25. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1243.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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The parties’ efforts to settle the dispute were unsuccessful, seemingly
because Sahyers sought substantial damages but refused to provide the
defendants with any proof regarding the amount purportedly owed.29
Nevertheless, following the close of discovery, defendants made an offer of
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6830 in the amount
of $3,500, which Sahyers accepted.31
The trial court entered judgment in Sahyers’s favor and granted her
leave to file a motion for attorney’s fees and costs.32 Defendants
principally argued in response that Sahyers was not a prevailing party in
the litigation and, therefore, was not entitled to any award under the
FLSA.33 The district court rejected this contention and, as a result,
acknowledged that the Act provided for a mandatory award of reasonable
attorney’s fees to Sahyers.34 Despite this concession, the court observed
that some cases involve “special circumstances” in which a reasonable fee
amounts to “no fee” and concluded that Sahyers’s case fell into this
category because of her counsel’s failure to provide any pre-suit notice to
defendants.35 While the court stopped short of finding that a formal
pre-suit demand letter is always required, it emphasized that:
[T]he [p]laintiff’s lawyer did not even make a phone call to try to resolve the
issue before filing suit. The [d]efendant is a law firm. Prior to filing suit in

29. Id. In addition, it is significant to note that during discovery plaintiff objected to providing
defendants with any evidence regarding the total number of excess hours she purportedly worked. Id.
30. Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that:
At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending against a claim may serve on an
opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If,
within 14 days after being served, the opposing party serves written notice accepting the offer,
either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk
must then enter judgment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 68(a).
31. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1243. Besides the $3,500, defendants’ offer of judgment also
included any attorney’s fees and costs to which the court deemed that plaintiff was entitled. Id.
32. Id. In her motion, Sahyers requested $13,800 in fees and $1,840.70 in costs. Id.; see
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (setting forth standards to determine award of attorney’s fees and costs in
an FLSA action).
33. Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L., No. 8:07-cv-52-T-30MAP, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 112849, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2008). Specifically, defendants contended that their
inclusion of a nonliability term in the offer of judgment, which Sahyers accepted, effectively
amounted to an agreement that defendants were not liable for any wrongdoing. Id. Along the same
lines, defendants maintained that the judgment entered by the district court was not on the merits
and, hence, the legal relationship between the parties remained unchanged—i.e., there was no
prevailing party. Id.
34. Id. at *4.
35. Id. at *4–5.
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this local area, it is still reasonable to pick up the phone and call another
lawyer so it won’t be necessary to file suit.36

Though the court may have been somewhat concerned with enforcing
common courtesy amongst members of the bar,37 it is apparent that the
court’s primary distress related to conservation of judicial time and
resources.38 In the court’s view, pre-suit notice, under circumstances such
as those involved here, might have completely obviated the need for a
lawsuit.39 It is possible, the court remarked, that a defendant could
unknowingly fail to compensate an employee for overtime and without a
pre-action demand, would be denied the opportunity to voluntarily make
restitution outside of litigation.40 The fact that defendants in this case
were lawyers may have had some bearing on the court’s decision, but this
seemed far less important than the judicial economy concern.41 In short,
the court viewed an award of fees and expenses in the context of this case
as tantamount to rewarding what it considered to have been “unnecessary
litigation.”42
Interestingly, Sahyers’s counsel’s only explanation for his failure to make
the desired pre-suit demand was that “his client did not want him to.”43
In response, the court pointedly reminded him that “the lawyer is the
officer of the [c]ourt, not the client.”44
B. Decision on Appeal
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit made it evident from the very first
sentence that the case was “about the power of a district court to supervise
the work of the lawyers who practice before it.”45 Sahyers I characterized
the district court’s decision as having recognized an exception to the
36. Id. at *5.
37. See id. (observing that Sahyers’s attorney “did not even make a phone call” or any other
reasonable effort to work with defendant’s counsel before initiating suit).
38. See id. at *6 (“This [c]ourt refuses to reward unnecessary litigation.”).
39. See id. (opining that pre-suit notice would have afforded the defendant an opportunity to
pay the overtime shortage outside of litigation and to show “its good faith desire to . . . compensate
the employee”).
40. Id.
41. See id. at *5–6 (observing that failure to afford the defendant a pre-suit opportunity to
resolve the action subjects the defendant to additional costs and attorney’s fees and results in the
devotion of judicial resources to unnecessary litigation).
42. Id. at *6.
43. Id. at *7.
44. Id. (emphasis added). The court added that it would “not permit lawyers to file
unnecessary litigation and palm it off on their clients.” Id.
45. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010).
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general rule under the FLSA, which mandates the award of reasonable
attorney’s fees and expenses to prevailing plaintiffs.46 The basis for this
exception, according to the court, was the trial court’s “inherent powers to
supervise the conduct of the lawyers who come before it and to keep in
proper condition the legal community of which the courts are a leading
part.”47
The court further maintained that these inherent powers “derive[] from
a lawyer’s role as an officer of the court” and include “the authority to
police lawyer conduct and to guard and to promote civility and collegiality
among the members of its bar.”48 This forthright nod to the cultivation
of behavioral norms ultimately proved pivotal to the court’s analysis, as it
found plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to provide pre-suit notice to defendants
to be contrary to these ideals.49
Critical to this assessment was the fact that defendants were attorneys.
In the court’s view, it was the height of incivility for plaintiff’s counsel to
sue fellow members of the bar without affording them some type of
forewarning and opportunity to respond.50 The court stated that:
Plaintiff’s lawyer slavishly followed his client’s instructions and—without a
word to [d]efendants in advance—just sued his fellow lawyers. As the
district court saw it, this conscious disregard for lawyer-to-lawyer collegiality
and civility caused (among other things) the judiciary to waste significant
time and resources on unnecessary litigation and stood in stark contrast to
the behavior expected of an officer of the court.51

As if this indictment of counsel’s behavior were not enough, the court
also went so far as to deem his lack of pre-suit notice, under the
circumstances, as rising to the level of bad faith.52 The court concluded
that the trial court’s refusal to award any attorney’s fees or costs to plaintiff
constituted a legitimate refusal “to reward—and thereby to encourage—
46. Id. at 1244 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006); Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216,
1223 n.12 (11th Cir. 2007); Kreager v. Solomon & Flanagan, P.A., 775 F.2d 1541, 1542 (11th Cir.
1985)).
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991); In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d
1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990)).
49. Id. at 1245.
50. See id. at 1245 n.7 (“Plaintiff’s lawyer showed . . . no courtesy to his fellow lawyers.”).
51. Id. at 1245 (footnote omitted).
52. See id. at 1246 n.9 (“[E]ven if bad faith is required, we conclude that the conscious
indifference to lawyer-to-lawyer collegiality and civility exhibited by [p]laintiff’s lawyer (per his
client’s request) amounted to harassing [d]efendants’ lawyers by causing them unnecessary trouble
and expense and satisfied the bad-faith standard.”).
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uncivil conduct.”53
After this strong endorsement of the district court’s perceived efforts to
promote civility and collegiality, the court ended its opinion by
ineffectually endeavoring to narrow its holding. The Eleventh Circuit first
cautioned against reading too much into the decision and stressed its
fact-intensive nature.54 The court then awkwardly cabined its opinion in
the following manner:
We put aside cases in which lawyers are not parties. We do not say that
pre-suit notice is usually required or even often required under the FLSA to
receive an award of attorney’s fees or costs. Nor do we now recommend that
courts use their inherent powers to deny prevailing parties attorney’s fees or
costs. We declare no judicial duty. We create no presumptions. We
conclude only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to award some attorney’s fees and costs based on the facts of this case.55

Notwithstanding all of these stultifying provisos, once the genie is out of
the bottle, it cannot be restrained so easily, as the judges who dissented
from the denial of plaintiff’s request for a rehearing en banc essentially
maintained.56
C. Denial of Request for Rehearing
Following the Eleventh Circuit panel’s decision upholding the denial of
attorney’s fees and costs, Sahyers requested a rehearing en banc.57
Though denied, there was significant disagreement among several
members of the court.58 Indeed, the author of the Sahyers I opinion,
Judge J. L. Edmondson, felt compelled to issue a concurring opinion
defending the panel’s holding and reasoning.59
In responding to concerns that the court had improperly overridden the
FLSA’s mandatory fee award provision, Judge Edmondson explained that

53. Id. at 1245.
54. Id. at 1246.
55. Id.
56. See Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 896 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Wilson, J., dissenting)
(lamenting that Sahyers, in effect, created binding precedent that the mandatory attorney’s fees
requirement under the FLSA is now subject to a discretionary exception).
57. Id. at 889 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
58. Compare id. at 890–91 (stating that the decision did not create a new rule and was needed
to protect civility within the judicial system), with id. at 892 (Wilson, J. dissenting) (arguing that the
panel’s decision created bad precedent and expressing doubts about its reasoning), and id. at 891–92
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (opining that the district court exceeded its authority to sanction the attorney
and ignored “the express mandate of Congress”).
59. Id. at 889–91 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
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the FLSA was not the exclusive law governing this case.60 In his view, the
court’s “inherent powers supplement[] the FLSA statute to make up the
whole of the applicable law.”61 According to him:
When the outcome favors the plaintiff, fees shall be awarded unless the
[d]istrict [c]ourt, in the reasonable exercise of its power to supervise lawyers
in their practice in cases before the [c]ourt, determines that an award of fees
(given the specific circumstances of a particular case) is not right—not right
directly because of lawyer conduct related to the specific case.62

Judge Edmondson went on to laud the importance of this inherent
authority and to contend that courts should be reluctant to permit its
dilution by the legislative branch.63 Although he somewhat grudgingly
admitted that Congress could abrogate the court’s power to supervise
lawyers, he maintained that it would have to do so “specifically, explicitly,
and directly.”64
Judge Edmondson, however, was quick to reiterate the narrowness of
the court’s holding. He stressed that neither the panel’s opinion nor the
district court’s order created a procedural rule requiring pre-suit notice in
FLSA cases, even when lawyers are suing individual lawyers.65 Though
this observation may have been technically accurate, it seems relatively
obvious that, going forward, a lawyer suing a fellow officer of the court
under the FLSA would be foolish not to provide some sort of pre-litigation
notification, certainly within the Eleventh Circuit, if not elsewhere.66
More importantly, though, Judge Edmondson’s restatement of the
decision’s limited reach does not in any way contract the broad inherent
authority and officer-of-the-court monitoring apparatus that he and his
fellow panel members endorsed. Indeed, he revisited this foundational
reasoning when he framed the district court’s decision as involving the
supervision of lawyers and the promotion of mutual civility and respect.67
60. Id. at 889.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 889–90.
63. See id. at 890 (“Courts ought to be highly reluctant to cede this traditional power dealing
with control of lawyer conduct in respect to cases that come before the [c]ourts . . . .”).
64. Id. Judge Edmondson also averred: “I believe that I am correct to say that Congressional
abrogation of the [c]ourt’s inherent power to supervise lawyer conduct must be clear and plain, before
the [c]ourts let that critical power get away.” Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 896 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (observing that even though the opinion states it does
not intend to create a new rule of pre-suit notice, “Sahyers is a published opinion, which makes it
binding precedent in [the Eleventh Circuit]”).
67. Id. at 890–91 (Edmondson, J., concurring). Notably, to support the propriety of this
approach, Judge Edmondson cited to a portion of the nonbinding Preamble to the Rules Regulating
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Judge Edmondson concluded with the same quote that begins this
Article,68 underscoring the centrality for the public and the judicial system
of “maintaining a bar that promotes civility and collegiality.”69
Judge Edmondson’s efforts to constrain Sahyers, if anything, rendered
the decision even more ominous. Because rather than having a bright-line
rule in the future to govern one’s behavior, lawyers are left to speculate as
to whether other slightly different factual circumstances may give rise to a
similar pre-suit notice obligation or some other type of unarticulated
civility-based procedural requirement.70 The upshot is that litigators—at
least within the Eleventh Circuit—must now contend with the looming
prospect of being blindsided by the ad hoc recognition of
officer-of-the-court duties that may conflict with obligations owed to their
clients.
In fact, that is precisely what happened to plaintiff’s counsel in this case,
and what comprised the principal bone of contention for Judge Rosemary
Barkett’s dissent from the rehearing denial. In particular, given the panel’s
characterization of the trial court’s denial of fees and costs as an “informal
sanction,”71 Judge Barkett maintained that plaintiff’s counsel was entitled
to some type of prior notice regarding the requirement of which he ran
afoul.72 In Judge Barkett’s opinion, “[b]ecause Sahyers’[s] attorney was
given no actual notice, the district court had no authority to sanction him
for failing to contact the defendants or their lawyers before filing suit.”73
Moreover, this lack of notice, in her view, was exacerbated by the fact that
the district court’s exercise of inherent authority was in direct
contravention of the FLSA’s mandatory fees and costs language,74 and
the Florida Bar that encourages lawyers to demonstrate respect toward one another. Id. at 890 (citing
Preamble, RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR (1992)).
68. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1244 n.5 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We believe and defend the idea
that maintaining a bar that promotes civility and collegiality is in the public interest and greatly
advances judicial efficiency: better ‘to secure the just, speedy[,] and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding,’ as Rule 1 demands.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 415 (2010).
69. Sahyers II, 603 F.3d at 891 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
70. Cf. id. at 894–95 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the court imposed a notice
requirement contrary to the express language of the statute and failed to cite any rule to support its
decision).
71. Id. at 891 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
72. See id. (“District courts do not have the authority to sanction lawyers for conduct not
proscribed by law or rule—which is the case here—without first providing them with notice that
their conduct may warrant sanctions.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b))).
73. Id. (citing In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995)).
74. See id. (noting that “there is no dispute that the language of the statute is mandatory”
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006))); see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“The court in such action
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thus, was “contrary to settled . . . Supreme Court precedent providing that
the use of a district court’s inherent supervisory powers is invalid when it
conflicts with a statutory command.”75
The other dissenter, Judge Charles Wilson, was even more pointed in
his criticism. Judge Wilson’s main concern was with what he considered
to be the dangerous and insupportable precedent that the court’s opinion
established—that “it is now within the inherent authority and discretion of
the district courts in our Circuit to hold that no attorney’s fee is a
reasonable fee when no pre-suit notice is extended to defendants who are
lawyers.”76 Similar to Judge Barkett, Judge Wilson contended that the
district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and costs was invalid because it
conflicted with the FLSA’s mandate.77 The panel had, according to him,
essentially read a pre-suit notice requirement into the terms of the FLSA,
at least when an attorney or a law firm is the target of the action.78
Though he acknowledged that “it is desirable to encourage lawyer
collegiality and to discourage unnecessary litigation,” Judge Wilson
deemed it inappropriate for the court to revise mandatory legislation to
further these policy objectives.79
More significantly, however, Judge Wilson expressed grave reservations
about the out-of-the-blue manner in which the panel recognized the
pre-suit notice duty. Specifically, the panel “failed to cite any statute, rule,
local rule, or case from [the Eleventh] Circuit, the Middle District of
Florida, or elsewhere that even arguably imposes a duty on an attorney to
contact prospective opposing counsel where that counsel represents a law
firm or a lawyer.”80 He also correctly noted the absence of any rule of
professional conduct that would alert counsel to the necessity of providing
soon-to-be lawyer-defendants with the “courtesy of advance notice.”81
shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s
fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” (emphasis added)).
75. Sahyers II, 603 F.3d at 891 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States, 487 U.S. 250, 284 (1988); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985)); accord id. at 892
(Wilson, J., dissenting) (“Although well-intentioned, I doubt that the federal courts have the inherent
authority to ignore and override a statutory mandate in the interest of promoting a professional
courtesy.”).
76. Id. at 892. Judge Wilson later stated that the “Sahyers opinion provides binding precedent
for a district court to ignore a clear Congressional mandate from a federal statute based on its
‘inherent powers.’” Id. at 894.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 738 (11th Cir. 2008)).
80. Id. at 894–95.
81. Id. at 895.
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The sole basis for recognition of this obligation was the court’s subjective
assessment of what is required of attorneys as officers of the court,
something that plaintiff’s counsel could not possibly have predicted.
Even more troubling for Judge Wilson was the fact that this
manufactured duty was given priority over plaintiff’s counsel’s duties to his
client. While he conceded that certain duties owed to the court by counsel
properly take precedence over client-centered responsibilities, the pre-suit
notice requirement in the context of this case was not one of them.82
Moreover, under the circumstances presented, Judge Wilson concluded
that there was nothing unlawful or unethical concerning plaintiff’s counsel
being instructed by his client to just file suit.83 Consequently, he was
actually ethically bound to do so.84 Given this, to subject plaintiff’s
counsel to what amounted to a sanction for his failure to comport with a
conflicting duty about which he had no prior notice—even in the interest
of promoting civility, collegiality, and judicial efficiency—seems to have
been unreasonable, at best.85
While Judges Wilson’s and Barkett’s disapproval of and reservations
about the panel’s decision are well-justified, the implications of Sahyers for
litigators, in reality, may be more significant and potentially far-reaching
than either of them contemplated. Part III elaborates upon these
conceivable consequences.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF AN OFFICER-OF-THE-COURT-BASED PRE-SUIT
NOTICE REQUIREMENT
Even if one accepts the proposition that Sahyers is limited to the narrow
circumstances presented, serious concerns accompany the Eleventh
82. See id. (noting that “while counsel owes a duty to the court, context matters”). Judge
Wilson also took issue with the court’s broad pronouncement that lawyers’ officer-of-the-court duties
generally take priority over duties owed to clients. Id. at 894; see In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 487–
88 (Del. 2007) (per curiam) (remarking that attorneys, as officers of the court, owe a greater duty to
the court to act within ethical boundaries than to the client’s interests).
83. Sahyers II, 603 F.3d at 895 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
84. See id (observing that “not only is there no rule requiring plaintiff’s counsel to give pre-suit
notice to his fellow lawyers, plaintiff’s counsel had an ethical duty to follow his client’s instructions”);
see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002) (requiring that attorneys abide by
clients’ instructions “concerning the objectives of representation”).
85. Judge Wilson closed his dissent by reiterating his misgivings about the precedent that the
panel created, and observed that courts both within and outside of the Eleventh Circuit had begun to
recognize “the proposition that no fee can be a reasonable fee under the FLSA when a plaintiff fails to
give pre-suit notice to a lawyer-defendant.” Sahyers II, 603 F.3d at 896 (Wilson, J., dissenting)
(citing Roldan v. Pure Air Solutions, Inc., No. 07-22203-Civ, 2010 WL 410571, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 29, 2010)).
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Circuit’s recognition of the pre-suit notice obligation. At a minimum, the
decision appears to open the door for district courts to exercise their
inherent authority over officers of the court to deny attorney’s fees in
FLSA lawsuits against lawyers when plaintiffs’ counsel fail to notify them
of an impending action prior to filing.86 More broadly, however, the
decision potentially empowers courts—in the ephemeral interest of
“maintaining a bar that promotes civility and collegiality”87—to recognize
heretofore unarticulated duties through the exercise of their inherent
authority.
Under Sahyers, it seems possible for district courts to punish whatever
attorney behavior they subjectively consider to be inconsistent with proper
litigation decorum because the panel’s reasoning is readily transferable to
virtually any lawsuit.88 Convincing support for this contention flows
directly from the two foundational pieces of the Sahyers courts’ pre-suit
notice duty—(1) the promotion of civility and collegiality;89 and (2) the
interest in judicial economy.90
A. The Promotion of Civility and Collegiality Within the Bar
The panel’s opinion in Sahyers placed substantial importance on the
maintenance of “a bar that promotes civility and collegiality,” and noted
that a federal court’s inherent power to control attorneys who practice
before it includes this authority.91 As officers of the court, lawyers are
beholden to this oversight and are bound to conform their behavior to
procedural and ethical standards reasonably established by courts.92
86. See id. (observing that “[i]t is now within the discretion of district courts in our [c]ircuit to
deny attorney’s fees to lawyers who fail to extend professional courtesies to lawyer-defendants in
FLSA and (presumably other) civil rights cases”).
87. Id. at 891 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
88. See id. at 894 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the opinion reads a requirement of
pre-suit notice into the FLSA, at least where a lawyer or law firm is the defendant, thus giving itself
the discretion to disregard the limits of the law it is charged with enforcing). Given the narrow scope
of the opinion, it admittedly may be more plausible that courts will limit their utilization of the
Sahyers blueprint to recognition of pre-suit notice obligations, but its underlying reasoning clearly
allows for potentially wider use. See id. at 891 (Edmondson, J., concurring) (stating that one of the
purposes of Sahyers was to promote collegiality in the judicial system).
89. Id.
90. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that the plaintiff’s lawyer’s
actions caused the district court “to waste significant time and resources on unnecessary litigation”),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010).
91. Id. at 1244 & n.5.
92. See In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 487–88 (Del. 2007) (per curiam) (stating that a lawyer’s
obligation to follow a court’s ethical requirements exceeds the duty to further a client’s interests);
State ex rel. Foster v. City of Kansas City, 350 P.2d 37, 43–44 (Kan. 1960) (concluding that when
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As a general matter, there is certainly nothing objectionable about such a
framework. Be that as it may, what qualifies as incivility will undoubtedly
vary depending upon the circumstances involved and the presiding
judge.93 Indeed, under the very facts of Sahyers, it would have been
entirely plausible for a different court to have found nothing offensive
about a lawyer obediently filing a lawsuit on behalf of a client who had a
factually and legally supportable claim, as did the plaintiff in that case.94
In Sahyers, however, plaintiff’s counsel’s blind adherence to his client’s
instructions, combined with defendants’ status as attorneys, rendered the
absence of notice peculiarly repugnant,95 and even led the panel to
conclude that he had acted in bad faith.96
In addition, Judge Edmondson enhanced the troubling likelihood that
courts may reach disparate conclusions in assessing attorney deportment by
tying the inherent authority to recognize and enforce civility-based
officer-of-the-court duties to local customs and practices.97 More
precisely, he observed for the panel that “[t]he customs of professional
courtesy were important to the district court.”98 He further sharpened
this characterization in his concurrence accompanying the denial of a
rehearing en banc, maintaining that “[t]he District Judge specifically tied
his decision to the local practices,”99 and acknowledging that “judges in
other areas of [the Eleventh] Circuit may have different views based upon
the state attorney general enters the court in his executive capacity, he becomes an officer of the court
subject to the ethics code); see also Leimer v. Hulse, 178 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Mo. 1944) (stating that
for a lawyer “[t]o properly do his part as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, his
conduct must conform to a high standard of ethics”).
93. See, e.g., Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to be Civil: Defining
Civility As an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 141 (2011–12) (noting
that “[i]n attempting a definition [of civility], one author went so far as to suggest that the best that
can be said . . . is, like Justice Stewart’s assessment of pornography, that ‘you know it when you see
it’” (footnote omitted) (citing Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don’t Work,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1988, at 79, 79)).
94. See Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 895 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Wilson, J., dissenting)
(observing that “plaintiff merely instructed her counsel to file a lawsuit, which—considering the fact
that defendants filed an answer as opposed to a motion to dismiss and ultimately offered judgment—
appeared to have at least, some merit”).
95. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1245 (observing that “[p]laintiff’s lawyer slavishly followed his
client’s instructions and—without a word to [d]efendants in advance—just sued his fellow lawyers”).
In a similar vein, the panel also observed that “[p]laintiff’s lawyer showed little concern for the district
court’s time and energy and no courtesy to his fellow lawyers.” Id. at 1245 n.7.
96. Id. at 1246 n.9.
97. See id. at 1245 n.8 (noting that the customs of professional conduct were influential to the
district court’s judgment).
98. Id.
99. Sahyers II, 603 F.3d at 891 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
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different local circumstances.”100 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit panel
made matters worse by wedding these provincial notions of civility and
collegiality to the equally pliable interest in judicial efficiency.101
B. The Interest in Judicial Efficiency
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supplies the guiding
principle by which the succeeding rules are to be interpreted and applied—
“[t]hey should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”102 The
latter statement embodies the concept of judicial efficiency, which is ever
in the forefront of most federal judges’ minds, not just with regard to the
administration of procedural rules, but also in connection with all other
aspects of the litigation process.103 Indeed, in 1993, the words “and
100. Id. Interestingly, Judge Barkett, in her dissent, took issue with Judge Edmondson’s
position regarding the significance of local attorney etiquette to recognition of the pre-suit notice
obligation. See id. (Barkett, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that the basis for the district court’s decision
was on local customs). Rather than basing its decision on local customs and practices, she contends
that all the district court really did was express its view that it is “reasonable” to contact another
lawyer before filing suit. Id. But see Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L., No. 8:07-cv-52T-30MAP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112849, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2008) (“Prior to filing suit in
this local area, it is still reasonable to pick up the phone and call another lawyer so it won’t be
necessary to file suit.”). As noted, the focus of her dissent was on the inequity of imposing a pre-suit
notice requirement on plaintiff’s counsel in the absence of any prior warning, and her assessment of
the manner in which the trial judge reached his decision strengthens her position. See Sahyers II, 603
F.3d at 891–92 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (opining that because the district court’s decision was not
based on any law, rule, or local custom, plaintiff’s attorney should have been afforded notice before
the sanction). In other words, the fact that the judge did not base his recognition of the duty on the
existence of an identifiable local custom renders his determination all the more unpredictable. Judge
Wilson, in his dissent, failed to even acknowledge the ostensible “local custom” aspect of the trial
court’s decision. For him, the absence of an articulated statute or rule that created the pre-suit notice
obligation was the real problem. See id. at 895–96 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the district
court’s decision was not based on any existing rule and its reliance upon a Second Circuit case was
misplaced (citing Litton Sys., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983))).
101. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1245 (ruling that the district court was correct in deciding that
the “conscious disregard for lawyer-to-lawyer collegiality and civility caused (among other things) the
judiciary to waste significant time and resources on unnecessary litigation and stood in stark contrast
to the behavior expected of an officer of the court”).
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
103. See Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 301–02 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming
district court’s discretion to order a more definite statement of pleadings “to avoid a waste of judicial
resources”); Gulf Grp. Holdings, Inc. v. Coast Asset Mgmt. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1265
(S.D. Fla. 2007) (“Procedural rules are designed to assist in case management and to prevent
prejudice to litigants, not to provide avenues for a litigant to escape liability on the basis of opposing
counsel’s technical misstep.”); Berube v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., No. 3:06cv197 (PCD), 2006
WL 3826702, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 30, 2006) (emphasizing the need to adhere to discovery
deadlines because to do otherwise would embrace a “chaotic system” making it “impossible for cases
to be resolved in a ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive’ manner contemplated by Rule 1” (quoting Billups
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administered” were added to the rule for the express purpose of
emphasizing the “affirmative duty of the court to exercise the authority
conferred by [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] to ensure that civil
litigation is resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost or
delay.”104
In Sahyers, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the importance of inherent
authority to federal courts’ strong interest in procedural efficiency and
proclaimed that adherence to the ideals of civility and collegiality within
the profession meaningfully advances that objective.105 In other words,
by working together in a courteous and cooperative fashion, lawyers
enhance the likelihood that justice will be obtained inexpensively and
expeditiously.106
Had Sahyers’s counsel acted with the requisite
professional courtesy by providing the defendants with pre-suit notice of
Sahyers’s claim, the court suggests that the dispute would have been
resolved without resort to litigation, thereby avoiding the unnecessary
expenditure of time and effort by the trial court.107
Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit linked the systemic obligation to
assist in the maintenance of an efficient judicial process to Sahyers’s
counsel’s status as an officer of the court.108 While that phrase is
admittedly somewhat confusing and subject to varying interpretations,109
v. West, No. 95 Civ. 1146 (KMW)(HBP), 1997 WL 100798, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1997)));
Enright v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1072 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (invoking authority
under Rule 1 and other judicial economy-related rules to impose a thirty-hour limitation for trial “to
ensure the interests of justice and to most effectively utilize the court’s resources”); Jackson v. Cnty.
of Sacramento, 175 F.R.D. 653, 658 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (limiting discovery to avoid undue expense in
accordance with Rule 1 (citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979))).
104. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (emphasis added).
105. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1244–45.
106. See id. at 1244 n.5 (declaring that “maintaining a bar that promotes civility and
collegiality is in the public interest and greatly advances judicial efficiency”).
107. See id. at 1245 (contending that plaintiff’s uncivil behavior “caused . . . the judiciary to
waste significant time and resources on unnecessary litigation”).
108. See id. (stating that the waste of judicial resources by uncivil behavior “stood in stark
contrast to the behavior expected of an officer of the court”).
109. See infra Part V.B (discussing various perspectives on the meaning of officer of the court);
see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 77 (1989)
(observing that the conflict between a lawyer’s role as an officer of the court and the more definitive
zealous advocacy duty “creates confusion and cynicism within the bar” (citing Heinz & Laumann,
The Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. L. REV.
1111, 1140 (1978); E. Wayne Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to Report Other Lawyers’
Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 95, 100)); George A. Riemer,
Officers of the Court: What Does it Mean?, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug.-Sept. 2001, at 27, 27 (contending
that the officer of the court label “is very ambiguous in meaning and gets in the way of understanding
the source and scope of the ethical duties of lawyers” (citing 37 Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 1251 (1976))).
See generally James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer of the
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it is frequently associated with a lawyer’s perceived role as an actual agent
of the court in regard to the administration of justice.110 Utilizing this
conception of the standard, the Eleventh Circuit deemed it incumbent
upon Sahyers’s attorney to act essentially as a judicial gatekeeper,
protecting the legal system from needless expense and effort.111
It is undeniable that the officer-of-the-court and judicial efficiency
components of Sahyers’s pre-suit notice duty cannot be restricted solely to
the facts and circumstances presented. Lawyers are officers of the court no
matter what the litigation context,112 and presumably their related
responsibility to safeguard the process goes hand-in-hand with that legal
station. Hence, it was, at best, naïve for the Eleventh Circuit to aver that
its decision did not establish precedent for recognition of pre-suit notice

Court”, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 387–408 (2000) (providing a thoughtful critique of the confusion
caused by the officer-of-the-court title with regard to a lawyer’s proper role).
110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (observing that “as
officers of the court, attorneys share [the court’s] responsibility” to ensure the fair and efficient
resolution of civil litigation); see also Minority Police Officers Ass’n of S. Bend v. City of S. Bend,
Ind., 721 F.2d 197, 199 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be
created through consent of the parties, federal courts “have an independent obligation to police the
constitutional and statutory limitations on [their] jurisdiction, and . . . counsel, as officers of the
court, have a professional obligation to assist . . . in this task”); Consumer Crusade, Inc. v. Pub. Tel.
Corp. of Am., No. 05-cv-00208-MSK-CBS, 2006 WL 2434081, at *7 (D. Colo. Aug. 21, 2006)
(maintaining that while “[e]very party has the right to zealously pursue all legal relief to which they
may be entitled, . . . counsel have a concomitant obligation as officers of the court and stewards of the
process to discourage the pursuit of . . . frivolous, inconsequential, or ineffective remedies”); People ex
rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that a lawyer, once admitted to the bar,
becomes an officer of the court); Langen v. Borkowski, 206 N.W. 181, 190 (Wis. 1925) (remarking
that a lawyer “occupies what may be termed a quasi[-]judicial office”); infra Part V.B (discussing how
courts use the officer-of-the-court label to emphasize the “higher calling” aspect of a lawyer’s role).
111. Other courts have embraced similar conceptions of what is required of their legal
“officers.” See Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 743, 750 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“As
officers of the court, attorneys have obligations not just to their clients, but also to the court, their
opponents, and society at large, to refrain not only from filing meritless lawsuits, but to refrain from
prosecuting them once it becomes clear that they are without merit.”); infra Part V.B (arguing that
courts sometimes adopt a “gatekeeper” view of a lawyer’s officer-of-the-court duties as seen in Cicero);
cf. Chi. Title & Trust Co. v. Verona Sports Inc., 11 F.3d 678, 679 (7th Cir. 1993) (observing in the
appellate context that “[c]ounsel, as an officer of the court, has a special responsibility to avoid
needless expenditure of judicial resources by addressing the issue of settlement, when appropriate, at a
point in the preparation of the appeal that does not place needless strain upon the court”).
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (discussing that
attorneys, acting as officers of the court, are entrusted with responsibility to promote the fair and
efficient resolution in civil litigation); Culkin, 162 N.E. at 489 (stating that a lawyer becomes an
officer of the court following admission to the bar); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of
the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 48 (1989) (explaining that as officers of the court, lawyers must
assume a quasi-judicial role which may force the subordination of client interests to serve the interests
of the public and judicial system).
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obligations in other settings.113
As further support for this proposition, it is instructive to examine the
purpose underlying the widely-adopted pre-suit notice requirement in
medical malpractice cases. Part IV demonstrates that the basis for
mandating pre-filing notification in such cases mirrors the Eleventh
Circuit’s principal rationale in Sahyers.
IV. PRE-SUIT NOTICE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
A common requirement in medical malpractice cases is that plaintiffs
formally notify defendants of their intent to sue prior to instituting an
action. In Texas, for example, Section 74.051(a) of the Civil Practices and
Remedies Code provides that:
Any person or his authorized agent asserting a health care liability claim shall
give written notice of such claim by certified mail, return receipt requested,
to each physician or health care provider against whom such claim is being
made at least 60 days before the filing of a suit in any court of this state
based upon a health care liability claim.114

Florida has a similar provision that imposes a ninety-day waiting period
following the mailing of the required notice115 and mandates, as a
prerequisite, pre-suit investigation.116
There are two related purposes for such provisions, both of which center
around a concern for judicial efficiency. The first is to promote settlement

113. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1246 (stating that Sahyers did not establish precedent and is
limited to its facts).
114. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.051(a) (West 2011).
115. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106(3)(a) (West Supp. 2012) (“No suit may be filed for a
period of 90 days after notice is mailed to any prospective defendant.”).
116. See id. § 766.106(2)(a) (“After completion of pre[-]suit investigation pursuant to
§ 766.203(2) and prior to filing a complaint for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify each
prospective defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for
medical negligence.”); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364(a) (Deering 2005) (“No action based
upon the health care provider’s professional negligence may be commenced unless the defendant has
been given at least 90 days’ prior notice of the intention to commence the action.”); D.C. CODE
§ 16-2802(a) (LexisNexis 2001) (“Any person who intends to file an action in the court alleging
medical malpractice against a healthcare provider shall notify the intended defendant of his or her
action not less than 90 days prior to filing the action.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2912b(1)
(LexisNexis 2004) (“[A] person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a
health professional or health facility unless the person has given the health professional or health
facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.”);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-412(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2008) (“A malpractice action against a health care
provider may not be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his
executor or successor, at least 90 days’ prior notice of intent to commence an action.”).
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without the necessity of an actual lawsuit.117 Specifically, pre-suit notice
is believed to open the line of communication between opposing counsel
before the respective parties expend substantial time and money on the
dispute and almost invariably become entrenched in their adversarial
positions.118
The second function served by the medical malpractice notice obligation
is to weed out frivolous claims. Though this purpose is more closely tied
to the merits-related certification requirements that typically accompany
such provisions,119 notice itself also undeniably plays a role here. In
particular, it forces plaintiffs to reflect upon and perhaps reconsider their
contentions before proceeding and gives defendants the chance to respond,
possibly in a fashion that alerts plaintiffs to the potentially meritless nature
of their proposed actions.120
It is interesting to note that encouraging settlement and deterring
frivolous litigation are the only rationales offered for pre-suit notice in the
117. See Rabatin v. Kidd, 281 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.) (observing
that “[t]he [l]egislature’s purpose in requiring notice in a medical liability suit is to encourage pre-suit
negotiations, settlement, and reduce litigation costs” (citing Hill v. Russell, 247 S.W.3d 356, 360
(Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.))); see also Largie v. Gregorian, 913 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (proclaiming that Florida’s medical malpractice pre-suit procedures “establish[] a process
intended to promote the settlement of meritorious claims at an early stage without the necessity of a
full adversarial proceeding” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
118. See, e.g., Rhoades v. Sw. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 554 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (observing that the medical malpractice pre-suit notification and investigation provisions
“evidence a clear legislative intent to discourage costly and time-consuming medical malpractice
litigation, to promote the culling of meritless claims, and to encourage settlement of meritorious
claims”).
119. Most medical malpractice pre-suit notice provisions also require that plaintiffs certify, in
some manner, the validity of their claims, usually by way of an expert affidavit or other formal
verification. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-8-4 (LexisNexis 2008) (“[A]n action against a health care
provider may not be commenced in a court in Indiana before: (1) the claimant’s proposed complaint
has been presented to a medical review panel established under IC 34-18-10 . . . and (2) an opinion is
given by the panel.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-15(A) (LexisNexis 2004) (“No malpractice action
may be filed in any court against a qualifying health care provider before application is made to the
medical review commission and its decision is rendered.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125(A) (Supp.
2011) (requiring pre-filing notice, as well as an affidavit of an expert witness).
120. See Slaughter v. United States, No. 5:08-1016, 2010 WL 1380009, at *7 (S.D. W. Va.
Feb. 3, 2010) (restating the West Virginia Supreme Court’s position that “the purposes of requiring a
pre-suit notice of claim and screening certificate of merit are (1) to prevent the making and filing of
frivolous medical malpractice claims and lawsuits; and (2) to promote the pre-suit resolution of nonfrivolous medical malpractice claims” (quoting Hichman v. Gillette, 618 S.E.2d 387, 394 (W. Va.
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Univ. of Miami v. Wilson, 948 So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“The policy underlying the medical malpractice statutory scheme is to require
the parties to engage in meaningful pre[-]suit investigation, discovery, and negotiations, thereby
screening out frivolous lawsuits and defenses and encouraging the early determination and prompt
resolution of claims.” (citing Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278, 284 (Fla. 1996))).
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medical malpractice context. Unlike the Sahyers notice requirement,121
there is no mention of any desire to promote civility or collegiality within
the bar, nor is the obligation characterized as emanating from a lawyer’s
role as an officer of the court. The most telling distinction, however, is the
bright-line statutory codification of the notice duty for malpractice cases.
By affording lawyers advance warning of their responsibility to notify
the opposition prior to filing an action, legislatures have eased the potential
tension that could exist between plaintiffs’ counsel endeavoring to fulfill
their duties as loyal, zealous client advocates while simultaneously living up
to their obligations as officers of the court. In other words, counsel has no
choice regarding whether to apprise a prospective adversary of an
impending action.122 If a plaintiff, as in Sahyers, demands that his or her
attorney file suit immediately without first contacting the defendants or
their counsel, the attorney would be legally unable to follow those
instructions. In fact, not only would it be improper to do so, it would
also, at a minimum, result in potentially prejudicial delay of the plaintiff’s
action,123 a fact that competent counsel would undoubtedly explain to a
recalcitrant client.124
The medical malpractice example plainly demonstrates that there is
nothing intrinsically wrong with a pre-suit notice duty. In fact, it seems
like an eminently reasonable requirement with various salutary benefits,
the most significant of which is enhanced judicial efficiency.125
Furthermore, even though the officer-of-the-court tag is not overtly
utilized as a justification for the obligation by legislatures, it is clear that

121. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1245–46 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010).
122. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364(a) (Deering 2005) (requiring notice before a medical
malpractice suit can be initiated); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106(3)(a) (West Supp. 2012) (same);
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2912b(1) (LexisNexis 2004) (same); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 74.051(a) (West 2011) (same).
123. See Hooper v. Sanford, 968 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1997, no pet.)
(observing that “[i]t is well-settled law in Texas that a plaintiff’s failure to give sixty days notice to
defendants should result in abatement”).
124. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2002) (providing that “[a] lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation”).
125. See Slaughter, 2010 WL 1380009, at *7 (emphasizing that pre-suit notice in medical
malpractice is designed to discourage frivolous claims and lawsuits as well as to encourage the
resolution prima facie malpractice claims before suit); Wilson, 948 So. 2d at 777 (explaining that the
medical malpractice statutes are intended to influence counsel to engage in pre-suit discovery, thereby
identifying frivolous claims and leading to the expeditious resolution of disputes); Rabatin v Kidd,
281 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.) (discussing that the notice requirement in
medical practice cases is intended to promote pre-suit negotiations and settlements out of court).
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this concept is likely lurking somewhere in the background.126 As a
result, notwithstanding its analytical flaws, the basis for Sahyers’s holding
appears sound at its core. Lawyers, as officers of the court, owe it to the
judiciary, the profession, and the public to treat one another in a civil and
respectful manner, which will reliably lead to enhanced judicial
efficiency.127 That is the central message of Sahyers, and one would be
hard-pressed to rationally disagree with its logic.
The problem, however, stems from the ex post, ad hoc approach
employed by the court. Sahyers’s result would have been more palatable if,
as in the medical malpractice setting, plaintiff’s counsel had advance
awareness of the pre-suit notice duty. He then could have explained to his
client why it was not appropriate to file suit without first contacting the
defendants. Generally, such a bright-line rule would simplify the lawyer’s
world and enable him or her to readily reconcile this particular
officer-of-the-court duty with obligations owed to the client.128 While
uncomplicating the potential ethical dilemma for counsel in this fashion
would be helpful, it could detract from the principal objective of
promoting civility and collegiality more broadly in the public interest.
As a result, it is important to examine more deeply the potential effects
of courts’ utilization of looming, unarticulated officer-of-the-court
responsibilities to achieve enhanced civility and collegiality. After
elaborating upon the evolution and meaning of the officer-of-the-court
label, Part V analyzes these effects.

126. Medical malpractice statutory objectives (i.e., preventing costly litigation and encouraging
settlement) are similar to the goals espoused in Sahyers for the officer-of-the-court duties recognized.
Compare Rhoades v. Sw. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 554 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(same), and Rabatin, 281 S.W.3d at 562 (listing avoiding costly litigation and encouraging settlement
as two goals of medical malpractice statutes), with Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1245 (remarking that it is
the duty of an officer of the court to avoid causing “the judiciary to waste significant time and
resources on unnecessary litigation”).
127. See Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 742, 750 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(stating that lawyers, under the officer-of-the-court label, have duties to their clients, opponents, and
society to refrain from pursuing meritless lawsuits as well as refrain from continuing to pursue
lawsuits upon the realization that they lack merit); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of
the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 43 (1989) (explaining that the officer-of–the-court label suggests
“lawyers owe a special duty to the judicial system or, perhaps, to the public that other participants in
the legal process do not owe”).
128. Cf. George A. Riemer, Officers of the Court: What Does it Mean?, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug.Sept. 2001, at 27, 27 (observing that the officer-of-the-court requirement is perplexing as a result of
its ambiguity and often interferes with a lawyer’s understanding of his or her ethical duties).
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V. OFFICER-OF-THE-COURT STATUS AS A VEHICLE FOR PROMOTING
CIVILITY AND COLLEGIALITY
A. “Officer of the Court” Defined
Black’s Law Dictionary defines an officer of the court as one “who is
charged with upholding the law and administering the judicial system.”129
While this description can be interpreted to encompass lawyers, Black’s
explains that the title is normally used in reference to judges, clerks,
sheriffs, and other individuals commonly thought of as court officials in a
strict governmental sense.130 Nevertheless, the dictionary definition
acknowledges that the officer-of-the-court label also applies to lawyers,
albeit in a more limited fashion.131 In particular, it suggests that two
components of a lawyer’s role justify “officer of the court” status: (1) the
obligation to obey court rules; and (2) the duty of candor owed to the
court.132
This definitional circumscription seems eminently logical in light of the
more accepted usage of the officer-of-the-court designation. Specifically,
for the judicial system to operate properly, the participants must fulfill
certain roles. Judges, clerks, bailiffs, and sheriffs all have official
responsibilities that facilitate the adjudicative process.133 Although
attorneys are typically private employees who represent nongovernmental
interests, they are, nonetheless, integral pieces of the juridical puzzle.134
As such, they must act not only to champion the private interests that they
serve but also to assist in the fair and efficient administration of the
process.135 The lawyerly duties that attach to this latter facet of the
129. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009).
130. Id.; accord In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 728 (1973) (noting that attorneys’ status as
officers of the court does not place them in the “same category as marshals, bailiffs, court clerks[,] or
judges”).
131. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009).
132. Id.
133. See Petition of Mone, 719 A.2d 626, 633 (N.H. 1998) (describing the role of bailiffs as
guarding juries and relaying messages to the judge); Langen v. Borkowski, 206 N.W. 181, 190 (Wis.
1925) (explaining “[t]he duties of the clerk of the court[]”).
134. See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 668 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (describing a
lawyer as “an intimate and trusted and essential part of the machinery of justice, an ‘officer of the
court’ in the most compelling sense”).
135. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“The purpose of
this revision . . . is to recognize the affirmative duty of the court to exercise the authority conferred by
these rules to ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost or
delay. As officers of the court, attorneys share this responsibility with the judge to whom the case is
assigned.”); see also Minority Police Officers Ass’n of S. Bend v. City of S. Bend, Ind., 721 F.2d 197,
199 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining that attorneys also have an obligation to assist the court in policing
its jurisdiction); Consumer Crusade, Inc. v. Pub. Tel. Corp. of Am., No. 05-cv-00208-MSK-CBS,
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attorney’s role are delineated in Black’s—adherence to rules that govern
judicial proceedings and the all-important obligation to be forthright and
honest with the court.136
The Black’s definition, in effect, restricts attorneys’ officer-of-the-court
duties by linking them directly to readily cognizable legal standards. For
example, if a lawyer disobeys a concrete rule of procedure or fails to
disclose to the court controlling contrary authority not cited by the
opposition,137 under the Black’s formulation, the lawyer has contravened
his or her role as an officer of the court and should rightly be subject to
appropriate consequences.138 In the author’s opinion, this approach
embodies the better view in terms of defining the scope of a lawyer’s
officer-of-the-court responsibilities. Unfortunately, it is not representative
of the philosophy that courts have traditionally embraced. Indeed, there is
no single, clear definition for officer of the court as it pertains to lawyers, a
fact that has historically created confusion.139

2006 WL 2434081, at *7 (D. Colo. Aug. 21, 2006) (stating that an attorney, “as an officer of the
court,” is obligated to not create unnecessary delay in litigation); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162
N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) (emphasizing the fact that attorneys, as officers of the court, are required
to “advance the ends of justice”); Langen, 206 N.W. at 190 (“An attorney at law is an officer of the
court. The nature of his obligations is both public and private. His public duty consists in his
obligation to aid the administration of justice; his private duty, to faithfully, honestly, and
conscientiously represent the interests of his client.”).
136. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009) (explaining that the term “officer of
the court . . . applies to a lawyer, who is obliged to obey court rules and who owes a duty of candor to
the court”).
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2002) (“A lawyer shall not
knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to
the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing
counsel . . . .”).
138. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009) (stating that as officers of the court,
lawyers must obey court rules).
139. See Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 n.3 (1956) (citing to various cases that
illustrate “confusion and difficulty of courts in explaining what is meant when a lawyer is called an
officer of the court” (citations omitted)); supra Part III.B (noting that the officer-of-the-court label is
confusing and subject to varying interpretations); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the
Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 77 (1989) (observing that the conflict between a lawyer’s role as an
officer of the court and the more definitive zealous advocacy duty “creates confusion and cynicism
within the bar” (citing Heinz & Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional Roles, and
Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1111, 1140 (1978); E. Wayne Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and
Judges to Report Other Lawyers’ Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV.
95, 100))); George A. Riemer, Officers of the Court: What Does it Mean?, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug.Sept. 2001, at 27, 27 (contending that the officer-of-the-court label “is very ambiguous in meaning
and gets in the way of understanding the source and scope of the ethical duties of lawyers”).
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B. Varying Perspectives on the Meaning of Officer of the Court
Although the genesis of officers of the court as a title for lawyers is not
entirely clear,140 its pedigree can be traced to England.141 Specifically,
English courts used to require that litigants “appear in court in company
with an official court retainer”142—they literally had to retain a “court
official” in addition to their privately retained solicitor.143 It should also
be noted that the first licensed legal professionals in England were actually
“officers of the Crown and, therefore, of its court as well,”144 and were
apparently referred to as “[s]ervants at law of our lord, the King.”145
Notwithstanding this technical, common law ancestry, officer of the
court has never really been employed quite so literally in reference to
private attorneys in America.146 Rather, the phrase was originally used “to
signal the close working relationship between courts and the lawyers
appearing before them, and also that courts are the front-line regulators of
lawyer conduct.”147 While this initial formulation seems somewhat akin
to the stance proffered in Black’s,148 over time, the American usage took
140. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 42 (1989)
(observing that “the origin of the characterization is murky”) (citation omitted); see also CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 1.6 (1986) (noting that the “origins of the ‘officer[-]of[]the[-]court’ title are obscure”).
141. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 732 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The role of a
lawyer as an officer of the court predates the Constitution; it was carried over from the English
system and became firmly embedded in our tradition.”); Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d
1536, 1546 (11th Cir. 1993) (observing that the “concept is as old as the common law jurisprudence
itself”); RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LAWYERS, COURTS, AND PROFESSIONALISM: THE AGENDA FOR
REFORM 120 (1989) (noting that “[t]he term ‘officer of the court’ was once an integral part of the
English system when lawyers were directly amenable to the king as parts of the royal judicial
system”); 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.8 (3d ed. Supp. 2011)
(maintaining that American courts borrowed the notion of lawyers as officers of the court from the
English); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 42 (1989)
(stating that many commentators have contended that “officer of the court” has its origins in
England, where nonparty participants in the legal system were the Crown’s officers and, therefore,
also officers of the court (citing GEORGE WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS 29–31 (2d ed.
1920))).
142. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 1.6 (1986).
143. Id.
144. Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 42 (1989).
145. Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1546 (quoting GEORGE WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS 30
(1902)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.8 (3d ed. Supp.
2011) (observing that “[a]lthough there is some evidence that at common law this literally meant that
lawyers were considered to be judicial officers, and thus members of the court, that was never the
American tradition”).
147. Id.
148. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009) (defining officer of the court as one
“who is charged with upholding the law and administering the judicial system”); supra Part V.A
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on a decidedly less definite and more pretentious air149 in an apparent
effort to distinguish “true” lawyer professionals from those of the so-called
“hired-gun” variety.150
Courts frequently carted out the label to emphasize the higher-calling
aspect of a lawyer’s role. For instance, in his oft-cited description of the
expectations that flow from membership in the legal profession, Justice
Benjamin Cardozo151 loftily sermonized about a lawyer’s rarified standing
as an officer of the court: “Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. [A lawyer is] received into that ancient fellowship for
something more than private gain. He [becomes] an officer of the court,
and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice.”152 The Wisconsin Supreme Court espoused a similarly laudatory
equation of officer-of-the-court status with a judge’s role in Langen v.
Borkowski.153 There, after acknowledging both the public and private
aspects of a lawyer’s responsibilities, the court appeared to go even farther
than Justice Cardozo in linking the duties of judge and attorney:
In every case that comes to him in his professional capacity, he must
determine wherein lies his obligations of the public and his obligations to his
client, and to discharge this duty properly requires the exercise of a keen
discrimination, and wherever the duties to his client conflict with those he
owes to the public as an officer of the court in the administration of justice,
the former must yield to the latter. He therefore occupies what may be

(discussing the Black’s definition).
149. See James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer of the
Court,” 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 349 (2000) (maintaining that the officer-of-the-court phrase “has
surprisingly little content [and] is mostly rhetoric, caused by self-love and self-promotion”); Eugene
R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 39 (1989) (describing the
officer-of-the-court characterization as “vacuous and unduly self-laudatory”).
150. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.8 (3d ed. Supp.
2011); accord In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 732 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (contending that
“[w]hatever the erosion of the officer-of-the-court role, the overwhelming proportion of the legal
profession rejects both the denigrated role of the advocate and counselor that renders him a lackey to
the client and the alien idea that he is an agent of government” (citing AM. BAR ASS’N, PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 1.1 (Approved Draft 1971))).
151. At the time, Justice Cardozo was the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals.
152. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added); see also GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 58 (1869)
(maintaining in regard to a lawyer’s oath that “[i]t is an oath of office, and the practitioner, the
incumbent of an office—an office in the administration of justice—held by authority from those who
represent in her tribunals the majesty of the commonwealth, a majesty truly more august than that of
kings or emperors” (footnote omitted)).
153. Langen v. Borkowski, 206 N.W. 181 (Wis. 1925).
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termed a quasi judicial office.154

The practice of sanctifying the role of legal professionals was further
heightened during the 1970s and 1980s as a response to the organized
bar’s concern over a perceived escalation in lawyer zeal and decline in
civility and collegiality among its members. The principal critic of this
changing paradigm was Chief Justice Warren Burger,155 who led the
charge for rekindling what he believed to be a lost sense of professionalism
in the bar.156 As a matter of fact, he was the primary inspiration for the
creation of the American Bar Association’s Commission on
Professionalism,157 which issued a report in 1986 titled “. . . In the Spirit
of Public Service:” A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer
Professionalism.158
In keeping with his grand view of the profession, Chief Justice Burger,
in a dissenting opinion in In re Griffiths,159 placed lawyers on virtually the
same plane as judges in describing their role as officers of the court. In
particular, he observed that even though attorneys’ specific duties are
154. Id. at 190; accord Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV.
39, 43, 48 (1989) (observing that the officer-of-the-court “characterization inherently suggests that
lawyers owe a special duty to the judicial system or, perhaps, to the public that other participants in
the legal process do not owe” and contending that the officer-of-the-court label “suggest[s] that
lawyers sometimes must act in a quasi-judicial or quasi-official capacity despite duties owed to their
clients”).
155. See John Stuart Smith, Civility in the Courtroom from a Litigator's Perspective, N.Y. ST.
B.J., May/June 1997, at 28, 28 (“Many trace the self-critical effort of the organized bar to determine
standards for appropriate professional conduct to the alarm sounded by former Chief Justice Warren
Burger in the early seventies.”); see also William C. McMahon III, Recent Development, Declining
Professionalism in Court: A Comparative Look at the English Barrister, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 845,
857 (2006) (explaining that Chief Justice Burger praised the integrity of barristers in England and
advocated for the establishment of a similar system in America (citing Hugh Maddox, An Old
Tradition with a New Mission: The American Inns of Court, 54 ALA. LAW. 381, 381 (1993))).
156. See John Stuart Smith, Civility in the Courtroom from a Litigator’s Perspective, N.Y. ST.
B.J., May–June 1997, at 28, 28 (“One of Justice Burger’s articles paid particular attention to what he
viewed as the deterioration in the level of civility displayed by lawyers in their dealings with each
other and with courts.” (citing Warren Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211, 213
(1971))).
157. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 19 (2010) (noting that
“[m]uch of the current focus on law as a ‘professional’ function is a legacy of the A.B.A. Commission
on Professionalism, created at the urging of Chief Justice Warren Burger in the mid-1980s”).
158. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986).
Interestingly, the report, among other things, stressed the need for the bar to place “far greater
emphasis . . . on the role of the lawyer as both an officer of the court and, more broadly, as an officer
of the system of justice.” Id. at 28. The Commission, however, did little to explain the composition
of these official roles, leaving it to others to provide such substance.
159. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
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different, as officers of the court, they are “part of the official mechanism
of justice in the sense of other court officers, including the judge.”160
Chief Justice Burger further noted the critical importance of lawyers’
independence from both the government and their individual clients, and
he emphasized how this sets the legal profession apart from other
occupations—attorneys are called upon, as officers of the court, to exercise
independent professional judgment as to which obligations of duty and
conscience play significant roles.161
Subsequently, in In re Snyder,162 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a
unanimous Court, again expressed a characteristically elevated opinion of a
lawyer’s role as an officer of the court, but this time he described that
status in more concrete, functional terms. This case involved attorney
Snyder’s challenging of a six-month suspension imposed by the Eighth
Circuit, stemming from a harsh letter that he sent to a district court
judge’s secretary criticizing the manner in which the circuit administered
the Criminal Justice Act.163 Specifically, Snyder had accepted an
appointment to represent an indigent criminal defendant and encountered
frustrating difficulties in his efforts to recover his related attorney’s fees and
expenses.164 As a result of the disrespectful tone of this letter, the Eighth
160. Id. at 731 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In Griffiths, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a Connecticut state court rule that required bar applicants to be citizens of the
United States. Id. at 729 (majority opinion). The appellant was a resident alien, rather than a U.S.
citizen, and on that basis alone, she was not permitted to sit for the Connecticut bar exam. Id. at
718.
161. See id. at 732 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (observing that “[t]he very independence of the
lawyer from the government on the one hand and client on the other is what makes law a profession,
something apart from trades and vocations in which obligations of duty and conscience play a lesser
part”); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 44–45
(1989) (noting that “[b]y asserting that their profession is somehow imbued with a public or judicial
element, lawyers distinguish themselves favorably from other occupational groups that serve their
own clientele as paid agents, concerned only with their principals’ narrow private interests” (footnote
omitted)).
162. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985).
163. Id. at 636–37.
164. See id. (describing the lawyer’s difficulty in receiving attorney’s fees due to insufficient
documentation and computer issues). In pertinent part, the attorney’s letter provided as follows:
[N]ot only are we paid an amount of money which does not even cover our overhead, but we
have to go through extreme gymnastics even to receive the puny amounts which the federal
courts authorize for this work. We have sent you everything we have concerning our
representation, and I am not sending you anything else. You can take it or leave it.
Further, I am extremely disgusted by the treatment of us by the Eighth Circuit in this case,
and you are instructed to remove my name from the list of attorneys who will accept criminal
indigent defense work. I have simply had it.
Id. at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Circuit ultimately found that Snyder violated Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 46 by engaging in “conduct unbecoming a member of the
bar,”165 and thus suspended him from practicing before the circuit for six
months.166
In determining whether the Eighth Circuit acted properly, Chief Justice
Burger observed that when assessing whether an attorney has acted in a
manner unbecoming a member of the bar, the court should acknowledge
the “complex code of behavior” and dual obligations to the court and
client that an attorney is required to follow.167 He then proceeded to
elaborate on a lawyer’s role as an officer of the court:
As an officer of the court, a member of the bar enjoys singular powers
that others do not possess; by virtue of admission, members of the bar share
a kind of monopoly granted only to lawyers. Admission creates a license not
only to advise and counsel clients but to appear in court and try cases; as an
officer of the court, a lawyer can cause persons to drop their private affairs
and be called as witnesses in court, and for depositions and other pretrial
processes that, while subject to the ultimate control of the court, may be
conducted outside courtrooms. The license granted by the court requires
members of the bar to conduct themselves in a manner compatible with the
role of courts in the administration of justice.168

Chief Justice Burger concluded, somewhat unhelpfully, that “conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar” is behavior inconsistent with
professional standards that demonstrates “an unfitness to discharge
continuing obligations to clients or the courts, or conduct inimical to the
administration of justice.”169 According to him, the substance for making
a determination as to a violation of this norm had to be ascertained from
other sources, namely, case law, court rules, and the “‘lore of the
profession,’ as embodied in codes of professional conduct.”170
While this functional approach to defining officer-of-the-court duties
seems like an improvement, it ultimately fails to inform lawyers of the
circumstances under which they would be deemed to have breached these
responsibilities. In fact, in concluding that Snyder did not engage in
“conduct unbecoming a member of the bar,” the Court confusingly
emphasized the necessity for civility by attorneys within the judicial
165. FED. R. APP. P. 46(c).
166. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 640.
167. Id. at 644 (quoting In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 324 (1st Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
168. Id. at 644–45.
169. Id. at 645.
170. Id.
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process—a standard to which Snyder admittedly failed to adhere.171 The
Court basically found that his conduct, while perhaps unlawyerly and
rude, was not sufficiently egregious by itself to warrant the suspension.172
The question begged, of course, is: What would be sufficient?
In more contemporary cases, many courts seem to have reverted back to
the esoteric, exalted conception of officer-of-the-court status, maintaining
that the phrase connotes that lawyers occupy a special place within the
judicial process and, accordingly, that there are some things that they
simply cannot do. This basically amounts to an “I know it when I see it”
model.173 In In re Moncier,174 for example, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee suspended an attorney from practicing
before it for seven years for, among other things, “refus[ing] to obey a
court order, threaten[ing] to abandon a client during a court proceeding,
and display[ing] disrespectful and contemptuous behavior toward[] the
institutional role of the judge.”175 The court judged counsel’s actions
against the officer-of-the-court standard, which it contended was triggered
by the oath that lawyers take when being admitted in federal district
court.176 Specifically, the court indicated that “[u]pon taking [the] oath
and being approved for admission, attorneys become officers of the court,”
which, at a minimum, requires them “to demean themselves as [attorneys]
uprightly and according to law.”177 Under this measurement, certain
conduct is unacceptable, and lawyers are expected to know this by virtue of
their status as officers of the court.178
The court did not offer much detail beyond this, although it did
pointedly respond to the offending attorney’s zealous advocacy defense by
proclaiming that “zealousness on the part of attorneys can never
super[s]ede their obligation to the profession and the law.”179 Elevating
this directive further, the court observed that:
171. Id. at 647.
172. Id.
173. Cf. Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility
As an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 141 (2011–12) (noting that
“[i]n attempting a definition [of civility], one author went so far as to suggest that the best that can be
said . . . is, like Justice Stewart’s assessment of pornography, that ‘you know it when you see it’”).
174. In re Moncier, 550 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Tenn. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 636 (6th Cir.
2009).
175. Id. at 770.
176. Id. at 769–70.
177. Id.
178. See id. (stating that lawyers are expected to conduct themselves professionally after they
take the oath and become officers of the court).
179. Id. at 806.
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The idea that zealousness can be an excuse for unethical and unprofessional
behavior is a pernicious disease that threatens to eat away at the integrity and
nobility of the court as an institution. Zealousness is commendable, but it is
not and cannot ever be an acceptable excuse for unprofessional and unethical
conduct.180

The point seems to be that the court, as an institution, is special, and
attorneys, as its officers, are likewise. Appropriate respect for the lofty
position of the judiciary is expected, and officers of the court should
inherently know the bounds of propriety.181
Similarly, in Rhodes v. MacDonald,182 another trial court resorted to the
officer-of-the court label in imposing a $20,000 sanction against a
plaintiff’s attorney under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for her
strident pursuit of a patently frivolous lawsuit.183 In particular, the action
consisted of an effort to prevent the plaintiff’s deployment to Afghanistan
based on the argument that the deployment orders were invalid because
President Obama is not a United States citizen and, therefore, is ineligible
to hold office.184 To make matters worse, plaintiff’s counsel had
previously filed an action of this nature with the court, which had been
dismissed.185 The attorney’s unflinching maintenance of the present
lawsuit, including moving for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, led
the court to issue the sanction, accompanied by a powerfully scolding
opinion.186
Although the sanction was grounded in Rule 11, the court spent a
significant amount of time emphasizing the inconsistency between
plaintiff’s counsel’s behavior and her role as an officer of the court.187 In
chastising the attorney for utilizing her briefs and motions to engage in
unnecessary personal assaults on the court and opposing parties, the court
noted that “an attorney, as an officer of the [c]ourt, has an obligation to
use legal proceedings for the legitimate purpose of pursuing a lawful cause

180. Id.
181. See id. at 769–70 (remarking that, upon taking the oath, attorneys are expected to
conduct themselves in accordance with professional standards, including “demonstrating respect for
the court”).
182. Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (M.D. Ga. 2009), aff’d, 368 F. App’x 949
(11th Cir. 2010).
183. Id. at 1366–68, 1384.
184. Id. at 1366.
185. Id. at 1366–67. In fact, the attorney had filed similarly frivolous lawsuits in the Middle
District of Florida and the Western District of Texas. Id. at 1366, 1367 & n.2.
186. Id. at 1369–70.
187. Id. at 1378–79.
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of action.”188 Even more significantly, the court went on to observe that
while plaintiff’s counsel’s ad hominem attacks in the case may have been
“good rhetoric to fuel the ‘birther agenda,’ . . . [they were] unbecoming of a
member of the bar and an officer of the [c]ourt.”189
Interestingly, the court’s use of the officer-of-the-court standard was not
as a substantive behavioral measuring stick but rather as an imprecise,
aspirational objective, which plaintiff’s counsel unquestionably failed to
fulfill.190 The court’s overriding message seems to have been that
attorneys’ unique status as officers of the court requires strict adherence to
unprescribed, innate expectations. It should not be necessary for a court to
provide attorneys with a laundry list of officer-of-the-court “dos and
don’ts.”191
Along lines similar to Rhodes, other courts have adopted what may be
characterized as a gatekeeper viewpoint of lawyers as officers of the court.
Specifically, it is a lawyer’s obligation to ensure that only meritorious
claims or contentions are espoused in a case.192 Clients may want to
pursue a particular tactic no matter what, but, when necessary, it is
counsel’s duty, as an officer of the court, to prevent this from happening.
A prime example of this perspective can be found in Cicero v. Borg-Warner
Automotive, Inc.193 In this age discrimination case, the court granted
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, determining that the action
was so lacking in merit that it should have been voluntarily dismissed.194
Although the court ultimately declined to impose a sanction on plaintiff’s
188. Id. at 1378.
189. Id. at 1378–79 (emphasis added).
190. Indeed, the court expressly delineated that the specific actions engaged in by plaintiff’s
counsel constituted an abuse of the privilege to practice law. Id. at 1365. For example, “[w]hen a
lawyer files complaints and motions without a reasonable basis for believing that they are supported
by existing law or a modification or extension of existing law, that lawyer abuses her privilege to
practice law.” Id.
191. Relying on Justice Cardozo’s famous quote from Karlin v. Culkin, the court stated, for
example, that: “For justice to be administered efficiently and justly, lawyers must understand the
conditions that govern their privilege to practice law. Lawyers who do not understand those
conditions are at best woefully unprepared to practice the profession and at worst a menace to it.”
Id.; see People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that membership in
the bar makes a lawyer an officer of the court). However, the court fails to articulate what those
conditions are, seemingly suggesting that they are simply things that a lawyer should know.
192. See Rhodes, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1365 (“When a lawyer files complaints and motions
without a reasonable basis for believing that they are supported by existing law or a modification or
extension of existing law, that lawyer abuses her privilege of practicing law.”); Cicero v. Borg-Warner
Auto., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 743, 750 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (stating that lawyers, as officers of the
court, have a duty to refrain from filing frivolous lawsuits).
193. Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
194. Id. at 758.
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lawyers, it nevertheless seized the opportunity to emphasize that: “As
officers of the court, attorneys have obligations not just to their clients, but
also to the court, their opponents, and society at large, to refrain not only
from filing meritless lawsuits, but to refrain from prosecuting them once it
becomes clear that they are without merit.”195 It is significant to note that
the court characterized the officer-of-the-court gatekeeper duties as being
owed not just to the court but also to the adversary and the public, adding
yet another level of potential confusion to the label.196
While there are undoubtedly other viewpoints regarding what it means
to be an officer of the court,197 the various perspectives recounted in this
section sufficiently convey the complexity of the issue and establish that
there really is no definitive model.198 A lawyer’s role as an officer of the
court can vary depending upon the situation involved, as well as the
identity of the decision-maker. When attorney conduct is patently
egregious, the absence of a well-formed standard is not problematic
because officers of the court clearly cannot conduct themselves in such a
manner.199 However, when the behavior in question is on the margins,
the lack of a rigid officer-of-the-court model becomes more challenging
because of the lack of predictability that it portends. The next section
explores the potential negative effects that may flow from the currently
ill-defined criterion.
C. Effects of Utilization of an Ill-Defined Officer-of-the-Court Model
Without question, there is a significant positive component to courts
utilizing an indefinite officer-of-the-court model. In particular, the
awareness that one’s conduct is being judged against a lofty, unarticulated

195. Id. at 750 (emphasis added).
196. Id.
197. See generally James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer
of the Court”, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 358–87 (2000) (discussing thoroughly and thoughtfully the
substance of the officer-of-the-court label); Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42
VAND. L. REV. 39, 48–76 (1989) (same).
198. See, e.g., Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1365 (M.D. Ga. 2009) (requiring
attorneys to adhere to unspecified duties as an officer of the court), aff’d, 368 F. App’x 949 (11th Cir.
2010); In re Moncier, 550 F. Supp. 2d 768, 769–70 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (stating that lawyers are
expected to conduct themselves professionally after they take the oath and become officers of the
court), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 636 (6th Cir. 2009); Cicero, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 750 (holding that lawyers
owe their officer-of-the-court obligations not only to the court but also opponents and the public); see
also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 76 (1989) (observing
that “courts use the [officer-of-the-court] concept in a general and vague manner”).
199. See Rhodes, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1384 (ordering sanctions for an attorney’s egregious
actions in part because “[a] clearer case could not exist”).
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standard could have the salutary effect of causing lawyers generally to be
more mindful and careful about their behavior. More to the point, the
uncertainty regarding what actions might run afoul of this measure would
likely force attorneys to err on the side of caution, especially when the
penalty for a violation is a sanction or some type of disciplinary censure.
This mindset could foster a number of positive practices among counsel,
such as: (1) more rigid screening of potential claims, contentions, and
defenses; (2) increased attention to ensuring the efficient progression of an
action; and (3) greater cooperation with and collegiality toward opposing
counsel. From a systemic standpoint, lawyers approaching the adversarial
process in this manner would be idyllic—creating a veritable utopian
judicial system, devoid of frivolity, delay, chicanery, and antagonism.
The problem with such a model, however, is that it fails to accord
proper weight to lawyers’ client-centered obligations and, as a result, may
unduly compromise their ability to advocate zealously and effectively on
behalf of clients. Specifically, it is possible that the unpredictability of the
indefinite officer-of-the-court approach could cause attorneys to be not
just cautious, but overly cautious, elevating their concerns for the court,
the system, the public, and themselves over the interests of their clients. In
other words, the standard may make counsel second-guess legitimate
adversarial strategies out of fear of getting on the wrong side of the court.
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that any officer-of-the-court duties
recognized by courts will necessarily take priority over client-centered
obligations when there is a conflict.200 An added concern is the prospect
for unequal enforcement of the malleable standard. Judges, like all
individuals, are susceptible to conscious and unconscious biases, which
may find expression in the manner in which they wield the officer-of-thecourt label.201
200. See Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1546 (11th Cir. 1993) (“All attorneys,
as ‘officers of the court,’ owe duties of complete candor and primary loyalty to the court before which
they practice. An attorney’s duty to a client can never outweigh his or her responsibility to see that
our system of justice functions smoothly.”); In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 487–88 (Del. 2007) (per
curiam) (“This responsibility to the ‘[c]ourt’ takes precedence over the interests of the client because
officers of the [c]ourt are obligated to represent these clients zealously within the bounds of both the
positive law and the rules of ethics.” (citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168 (1986))); Langen v.
Borkowski, 206 N.W. 181, 190 (Wis. 1925) (creating a similar officer-of-the-court standard); see also
Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 48 (1989) (observing that
the “primary distinguishing characteristic of the duties making up the officer[-]of[-]the[-]court
obligation . . . must be their subordination of the interests of the client and the lawyer to those of the
judicial system and the public”).
201. See Amy R. Mashburn, Making Civility Democratic, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (2011)
(observing that the “refusal to unpack the ‘officer of the court’ and ‘law is not a business’ ideals has
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In many cases, the possible problems associated with an ill-defined
officer-of-the-court model will not be present—namely, those situations
where an attorney’s conduct is patently inappropriate, like some of the
examples discussed in the previous section.202 There, sanctioning or
otherwise censuring a lawyer for failure to live up to his or her role as an
officer of the court, in essence, simply states the obvious and highlights the
impropriety of what has been done. The lawyers should have known
better, and using the label to emphasize this point does not in any way
undermine legitimate zealous representation.
The problems will arise in cases where the conduct that purportedly
offends the officer-of-the-court standard is comprised of actions that
lawyers may legitimately undertake on behalf of a client. Sahyers is
obviously the quintessential example of this. No lawyer could have
predicted that his or her duties as an officer of the court entailed providing
lawyer-defendants with pre-suit notice in the interest of civility and
collegiality. And the prospect that other courts may see fit to recognize
similar unforeseeable court or adversary-centered obligations militates
rather strongly against the maintenance of an ill-defined
officer-of-the-court model.
A reasonable response may be that Sahyers is merely an aberration, and
the Eleventh Circuit panel’s narrowing gymnastics sufficiently ensure that
its example will not be emulated.203 Unfortunately, as Judge Wilson
observed in his dissent from the denial of the rehearing en banc, there is
nothing to prevent courts from adopting the specific pre-suit notice duty
recognized by the panel, let alone the analytical framework that gave rise to
the creation of that obligation.204 Courts are free to replicate it.
Moreover, Sahyers is not the lone case to have used an officer-of-the-court
the effect of allowing the Bar to advocate enforcement of open-ended norms that are not the subject
of legislative deliberation or even much informal debate” (citing Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 289 (2006))). Masburn
goes on to state that “[t]his is an ideal environment for judges to put into effect, consciously or
unconsciously, their expectations about entitlement to deference.” Id.
202. See In re Moncier, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 770 (suspending an attorney for “refus[ing] to obey
a court order, threaten[ing] to abandon a client during a court proceeding, and display[ing]
disrespectful and contemptuous behavior towards the institutional role of the judge”); supra Part V.B
(discussing recent cases that have reverted back to the more esoteric conception of officer-of-the-court
status).
203. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2009) (limiting the reach of Sahyers by
stating that the decision was fact-intensive), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010).
204. See Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 894 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Wilson, J., dissenting)
(“Sahyers . . . provides binding precedent for a district court to ignore a clear Congressional mandate
from a federal statute based on its ‘inherent powers.’”).
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standard to impose an unwritten and unforeseeable duty that conflicts with
a legitimate adversarial position.205
In Smith v. Johnston,206 the Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed setting
aside a default judgment because plaintiff’s counsel was found to have
engaged in “conduct . . . prejudicial to the administration of justice,”207 a
standard perhaps even more malleable than the ill-defined
officer-of-the-court measure.208 Specifically, the court found that the
lawyer’s failure to provide opposing counsel with notice of her intent to
pursue a default judgment was prejudicial to the administration of justice
and warranted the setting aside of that judgment under Indiana Trial
Rule 60(b)(3) for attorney misconduct.209
Smith involved a medical malpractice action that required a plaintiff to
submit his or her claim to a medical review panel for approval as a
prerequisite to filing suit.210 In connection with this process, plaintiff’s
counsel became aware that the defendants were represented by counsel.211
Indeed, following the medical review panel’s approval of the claim,
plaintiff’s counsel sent a written settlement demand to defendants’
attorneys, a rejection of which was received on the very day that the suit
was filed.212
Plaintiff’s counsel properly served the defendants with the summons and
complaint in the action but did not send copies thereof to the defendants’
counsel.213 The court acknowledged that this approach and the plaintiff’s
counsel’s subsequent failure to provide opposing counsel with notice of the
pursuit of a default judgment were in full compliance with the pertinent
205. See, e.g., Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1263–64 (Ind. 1999) (recognizing
unwritten duties inherent in being an officer of the court).
206. Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. 1999).
207. Id. at 1264.
208. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 65.6 (3d ed. Supp.
2009) (observing that while Rule 8.4(d) largely overlaps with other litigation-oriented Rules of
Professional Conduct, “it may signify the existence of other, as yet undefined, offenses against a
tribunal or against the administration of justice”). “While some flexibility in defining disciplinary
offenses is desirable, in order to ensure that novel forms of misconduct do not fall between the cracks,
an open-ended rule is dangerous.” Id. (footnote omitted). Notwithstanding its facial vagueness, Rule
8.4(d) has survived numerous constitutional challenges for vagueness and overbreadth. ELLEN J.
BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 626 (7th ed. 2011)).
209. Smith, 711 N.E.2d at 1260–61.
210. Id. at 1261; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-8-4 (Lexis Nexis 2008) (“[A]n action
against a health care provider may not be commenced in a court in Indiana before: (1) the claimant’s
proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review panel established under
IC 34-18-10 . . . and (2) an opinion is given by the panel.”).
211. Smith, 711 N.E.2d at 1261.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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procedural rules of the court.214 Nonetheless, the court concluded that
these rules did not contemplate the possibility of a plaintiff’s attorney
possessing knowledge of a defendant’s representation by counsel, as was
the situation here.215 According to the court, plaintiff’s counsel’s
knowledge gave “rise to a corresponding duty under the Rules of
Professional Conduct to provide notice before seeking any relief from the
court.”216 Though admittedly not stated in the text of any particular rule,
the court emphasized that:
[L]awyers’ duties are found not only in the specific rules of conduct and rules
of procedure, but also in courtesy, common sense[,] and the constraints of
our judicial system. As an officer of the [c]ourt, every lawyer must avoid
compromising the integrity of his or her own reputation and that of the legal
process itself. These considerations alone demand that [plaintiff’s counsel]
take the relatively simple step of placing a phone call to [defendant’s counsel]
before seeking a default judgment.217

Despite this statement suggesting that the notification duty somehow
arose from the inherent officer-of-the-court responsibilities of a lawyer, the
court proceeded to link the obligation to Rule 8.4(d) of Indiana’s Rules of
Professional Conduct, which states that it is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.218
Specifically, the court held that “[t]he administration of justice requires
that parties and their known lawyers be given notice of a lawsuit prior to
seeking a default judgment.”219 Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to undertake
reasonable steps to notify defendants’ counsel, under the circumstances,
therefore ran afoul of this rule and warranted the setting aside of the
default judgment.220
214. See id. at 1263 (“We agree with [plaintiff’s counsel] that Trial Rule 4 calls for service of
the summons and complaint on the party, not the attorney, to secure jurisdiction. We also agree that
Trial Rule 5(B) requires service of subsequent papers only on attorneys who have filed their
appearance in the case.”).
215. See id. (observing that the rules “anticipate that a defendant in a lawsuit may not have
retained an attorney at the time suit is filed,” and even if that is not the case, the plaintiff may not be
aware of this).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1263–64 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 1264. The court also made reference to the Preamble to the Rules of Professional
Conduct. See id. at 1263 (recognizing that “[t]he Rules, do not, however, exhaust the moral and
ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be
completely defined by legal rules.” (quoting IND. R. PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., available at
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/prof_conduct/#_Toc313019170) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
219. Id. at 1264.
220. Id.
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While the result in Smith is certainly understandable—as was true in
Sahyers—the court’s analytical approach is quite troubling. To be sure, it
would have been civil or collegial for plaintiff’s lawyer to have given
defense counsel notice about the filing of the lawsuit and the pursuit of a
default judgment.221 However, the fact that no express rule required such
notification definitely put plaintiff’s counsel in a precarious position,
particularly because she was in full compliance with the pertinent
procedural rules.222 The attorney’s legal position, under all available,
tangible litigation measures, was legitimate.223 To penalize her and her
client under these circumstances, based on a previously unarticulated duty,
seems unfair, at best. Additionally, the court’s strained attempt to ground
its holding in an actual rule appears intended to address the concern of
subjecting counsel to a yet-to-be-recognized professional obligation.224
The court’s effort in this regard, though, falls woefully short in light of its
selection of perhaps the vaguest standard contained in the Rules of
Professional Conduct as the source for this officer-of-the-court type
duty.225
Sahyers and Smith undoubtedly are not the only cases that involve courts
creating new duties out of general conceptions of lawyers’ status as officers
of the court.226 But even if they are, their existence alone is enough to
establish the looming possibility that other courts may follow suit in the
future. As a result, attorneys’ ability to advocate zealously and effectively
on behalf of their clients may be hindered by undue concern for the
interests of the court, the opposition, the public, or even themselves. This
221. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2009) (requiring pre-suit notice in part
because it would promote civility among lawyers (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43
(1991); In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990))), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415
(2010).
222. See Smith, 711 N.E.2d at 1262–64 (recognizing that plaintiff’s attorney’s conduct was
consistent with the pertinent trial rules).
223. See id. (recognizing that plaintiff’s attorney had complied with the requirements of the
applicable trial rules).
224. See id. at 1263–64 (using Rule 8.4(d)’s vague “administration of justice” clause to justify
the holding).
225. For a case reaching a result contrary to Smith, see Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 775
S.W.2d 97, 100–01 (Mo. 1989) (holding plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to advise defense counsel of the
entry of a default judgment until after it was no longer likely to be set aside as a matter of course to
be an invalid basis for setting the judgment aside), superseded by MO. R. CIV. P. 74.05, as recognized
in Cont’l Basketball Ass’n v. Harrisburg Prof’l Sports Inc., 947 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
But see id. at 109–12 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting) (condemning plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct in taking
advantage of defense counsel’s mistaken belief that the case was pending, rather than in default).
226. Cf. Dondi Props. Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 288–89 (N.D.
Tex. 1988) (per curiam) (adopting standards of litigation conduct for lawyers appearing before the
court apart from existing ethical and procedural rules).
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potentially serious adverse effect on attorneys’ client-centered
responsibilities can be significantly mitigated by adopting a model that is
wedded to existing, clearly articulated procedural and ethical norms.
Notably, in Sahyers, Judge Wilson, in his dissent from the request for
rehearing en banc, emphasized as problematic the absence of any rule or
statute regarding the pre-suit notice duty recognized by the Eleventh
Circuit panel.227 Judge Barkett, in her dissent, raised a similar point,
noting that plaintiff’s counsel was entitled to some type of prior notice
regarding the specific officer-of-the-court requirement which he was
deemed to have violated.228 Part VI takes these critiques to heart and
proposes that officer-of-the-court ideals should be emphasized and
enforced only through existing procedural and professional constraints on
lawyer conduct.
VI. A BETTER APPROACH: DEFINING OFFICER-OF-THE-COURT IDEALS
THROUGH EXISTING PROCEDURAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONSTRAINTS
Highlighting the fact that a lawyer is an officer of the court, in addition
to being a client’s advocate, is important, and courts should continue to
remind counsel of this essential component of bar membership, as did the
Eleventh Circuit panel in Sahyers. It is critical, however, to establish ex
ante definitional parameters for officer-of-the-court-based duties to avoid
unduly hamstringing lawyers’ legitimate client-centered advocacy.
Of all the approaches to defining what it means to be an officer of the
court, the formulation contained in Black’s Law Dictionary best captures
the essence of what this Article views as the optimal methodology for
practically and effectively emphasizing and enforcing officer-of-the-court
ideals without compromising a lawyer’s ability to pursue legitimate
adversarial objectives.229 In particular, Black’s ties a lawyer’s status as an
officer of the court to two related duties: (1) the duty to obey court rules;
and (2) the “duty of candor to the court.”230 The only caveat that this
227. See Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 894–95 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Wilson, J., dissenting)
(observing that the majority failed to cite any rule that imposes this duty).
228. See id. at 891 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“District courts do not have the authority to
sanction lawyers for conduct not proscribed by law or rule—which is the case here—without first
providing them with notice that their conduct may warrant sanctions.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
83(b))).
229. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009) (providing that a lawyer’s obligations
as an officer of the court are to obey court rules and to provide candor to the court).
230. Id. The duty of candor finds content both in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11
(requiring that attorneys certify that papers presented to the court are nonfrivolous and not
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Article would add is that “court rules” should be interpreted to include
rules of professional conduct that pertain to the litigation process,231 as
well as applicable rules of procedure.232 If a duty cannot be linked to such
pre-existing, clearly identifiable court rules, then a court should not be
permitted to resort to the officer-of-the-court mantra to manufacture it.
One might argue that this would inappropriately circumscribe courts’
ability to ensure the efficient administration of the judicial process through
the exercise of their time-honored inherent authority to regulate the
practice of law.233 While the approach endorsed here would admittedly
restrict courts’ ability to utilize purely inherent authority to contend with
officer-of-the-court-based attorney misconduct, it should not adversely
affect their overall capacity to address such behavior. Indeed, various
courts have given content to the officer-of-the-court standard by directly
linking it to such provisions as litigation-focused standards contained in
the Rules of Professional Conduct and certain Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.234 In doing so, these courts were still able to respond
effectively and fairly to improper attorney conduct.235
interposed for an improper purpose); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002) (imposing
a duty of candor towards tribunals).
231. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002) (“Meritorious Claims and
Contentions”); id. R. 3.2 (“Expediting Litigation”); id. R. 3.3 (“Candor Toward the Tribunal”); id.
R. 3.4 (“Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel”); id. R. 3.5 (“Impartiality and Decorum of the
Tribunal”); see also Amy R. Mashburn, Making Civility Democratic, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1147, 1164–
65 (2011) (discussing various rules of professional conduct used by courts to give content to a
standard for judging incivility as revealed in empirical study of cases).
232. See Four Star Fin. Servs., LLC v. Commonwealth Mgmt. Ass’n, 166 F. Supp. 2d 805, 807
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (using Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 as a point of reference for the substance
of the officer-of-the-court label); see also Amy R. Mashburn, Making Civility Democratic, 47 HOUS.
L. REV. 1147, 1163 (2011) (discussing courts’ use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 28
U.S.C. § 1927 to give content to standard for judging incivility as revealed in empirical study of
cases).
233. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2009) (maintaining that a court’s inherent
powers include “the authority to police lawyer conduct and to guard and to promote civility and
collegiality among the members of its bar”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010); see also Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991) (exploring the scope of the court’s inherent power to police
litigants’ conduct).
234. See, e.g., GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 252 F.R.D. 253, 257–58 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (relying
upon the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
sanction a lawyer for abusive behavior); Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 98 CIV
10175(JSM), 2002 WL 59434, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002) (linking Rule 11 with an attorney’s
officer-of-the-court duties), aff’d, 317 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2003).
235. See, e.g., GMAC Bank, 252 F.R.D. at 254 (using existing rules of civil procedure to
sanction “outrageous” and “inexcusable” conduct during a deposition (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Patsy’s Brand, 2002 WL 59434, at *4, 5 (utilizing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to
sanction a party for providing false statements via its counsel and fabricating documents).
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In GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp.,236 for example, the court relied, in
part, upon Rules 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 8.4 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Professional Conduct, as well as Rules 30 and 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, in sanctioning a defense attorney for failing to take
appropriate action to curtail his client’s excessively abusive behavior during
his deposition.237 During a telephone conference regarding the matter,
the court expressed its concern with counsel’s inaction by couching it in
terms of his duty as an officer of the court, as defined by the Rules of
Professional Conduct.238 Specifically, the court maintained that “under
the Code of Professional Conduct, counsel has certain obligations as an
officer of the court which must be harmonized with counsel’s obligations
to provide zealous representation.”239 The court went on to observe that,
by sitting idly by while his client engaged in behavior “designed to obstruct
the proceedings,” defense counsel may have violated “Rules of Professional
Conduct 3.4, 3.5[,] and 8.4.”240 It later expanded the number of rules
that counsel may have violated to include Rules 3.2 and 3.3, along with
the pertinent procedural rules related to discovery abuse.241 The sanction,
however, was ultimately only tied to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure—specifically, Rules 30(d)(2) and 37(a)(5)(A).242
Interestingly, this particular opinion addressed defense counsel’s motion
to reconsider the sanction imposed upon him, based primarily on the
argument that he had not been given adequate notice that his conduct was
being assessed under the procedural rules.243 It is significant to note that
the court acknowledged the requirement in the Third Circuit, and
elsewhere, that a “party against whom sanctions are being considered is
entitled to notice of the legal rule on which the sanctions would be based, the
reasons for the sanctions, and the form of the potential sanctions.”244 What is
236. GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 252 F.R.D. 253 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
237. Id. at 257–58.
238. Id. at 255.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 257.
242. Id. at 258.
243. Id. at 254.
244. Id. at 259 (quoting In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 380 (3d Cir.
1997), abrogated on other grounds by Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198 (1999));
see also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 236 (3d Cir. 2001) (observing that “[t]he Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment [generally] requires a federal court to provide notice and an
opportunity to be heard before sanctions are imposed on a litigant or attorney” (first alteration in
original) (quoting Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1262 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted))). The court in GMAC Bank ultimately denied defense counsel’s motion to reconsider,
finding, in part, that he had been provided ample notice of the potential bases for the sanction, thus
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most important about this generally accepted requirement for purposes of
the proposed approach is that it reflects an expectation that an identifiable
rule will provide the basis for a sanction, which necessarily means that
attorneys will have advanced notice of whatever duty they are alleged to
have breached or, at a minimum, will have the ability to ascertain that
duty.
In another case, Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc.,245 a court
linked attorneys’ officer-of-the-court duties to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.246 The court concluded that the lawyers violated Rule 11
by permitting their client to submit a false affidavit and in doing so
observed that “[f]ew responsibilities of an attorney, as an officer of the
court, are more important than the duty to insure that his client does not
commit perjury or obstruct justice.”247
Similarly, in Four Star Financial Services, LLC v. Commonwealth
Management Ass’n,248 the court used Rule 11 as a point of reference for
the substance of the officer-of-the-court label.249 In particular, in
discussing the Rule 11 standard, the court observed that as officers of the
court, attorneys must “properly temper[] enthusiasm for a client’s cause
with careful regard for the obligations of truth, candor, accuracy, and
professional judgment.”250
Apart from these examples, which suggest that much of the conduct that
arguably offends courts’ officer-of-the-court sensibilities can be addressed
through extant rule-based standards, it is critical to point out that the
Supreme Court has essentially already declared that this is the preferred
method in federal court. Specifically, in the seminal inherent authority
case, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,251 the Court held that “when there is
bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately
sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules
rather than [its] inherent power.”252 The Court did proceed to note,
however, that “if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the

affording him a meaningful opportunity to respond. GMAC Bank, 252 F.R.D. at 255.
245. Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 98 CIV 10175(JSM), 2002 WL 59434
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002), aff’d, 317 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2003).
246. Id. at *5.
247. Id.
248. Four Star Fin. Servs., LLC v. Commonwealth Mgmt. Ass’n, 166 F. Supp. 2d 805
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
249. Id. at 807.
250. Id. (quoting Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1267 (2d Cir. 1986)).
251. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
252. Id. at 50.
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statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its
inherent power.”253 In any event, it is apparent that federal courts are
cautioned to exercise their inherent authority sparingly, at most.254
Hence, defining officer-of-the-court ideals in the manner endorsed here, in
reality, should not significantly alter the current sanctioning landscape, at
least not in the federal arena.
Moreover, to the extent that certain types of misconduct do not
currently fall within existing legal or ethical provisions—and there should
not be many—there is certainly nothing that prevents courts from creating
a positive rule that covers the situation. In other words, if a duty is of
sufficient importance to fall within a lawyer’s officer-of-the-court
responsibilities, then it should be formally enacted as a court rule to be
applied prospectively.255
Again, it is important to emphasize that the suggested approach is
geared towards circumstances on the margins, in which lawyers’ conduct is
arguably appropriate under pertinent legal and ethical principles, but
nevertheless is deemed by courts to somehow offend their role as officers of
the court. In these types of situations, as in Sahyers and Smith, attorneys,
as advocates, are entitled to some sort of concrete notice to enable them to
properly calibrate their responsibilities to the court, the opposition, and
the system with those owed to their clients.256 Only in this manner can
the officer-of-the-court label be imbued with practical substance, enabling
courts to summon it in a professionally constructive and fair fashion.

253. Id.; see id. at 64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (maintaining that “[i]nherent powers are the
exception, not the rule, and their assertion requires special justification in each case”).
254. See id. at 50 (majority opinion) (recognizing that a court must “exercise caution in
invoking its inherent power”).
255. It is important to note that the author fully accepts that there may be certain officer-ofthe-court situations that nevertheless warrant a court’s invocation of its inherent authority. However,
those situations, in the words of Justice Kennedy, should be “the exception, not the rule.” Id. at 64
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy went on to observe that “as the number and scope of
Rules and statutes governing litigation misconduct increases, the necessity to resort to inherent
authority . . . lessens.” Id. at 70.
256. See Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 236 (3d Cir. 2001) (observing that only with
notice and an opportunity to be heard “can a party respond to the court’s concerns in an intelligent
manner” (quoting In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 379 (3d Cir. 1997),
abrogated on other grounds by Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198 (1999))); see also
Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 891 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (stating that
“district courts do not have the authority to sanction lawyers for conduct not proscribed by law or
rule—which is the case here—without first providing them with notice that their conduct may
warrant sanctions.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b))); Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 894 (11th Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing against the court’s recognition of a new duty after failing
to cite any identifiable rule with which this duty could be linked).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Most would wholeheartedly agree that the central message of Sahyers v.
Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L., as an ideal, is a sound one—i.e., the
profession, the legal system, and the public good are all better served by the
exhibition of greater civility and collegiality by lawyers towards one
another.257 Similar support, no doubt, exists for the general proposition
that the officer-of-the-court label serves as a laudable reminder that
lawyers’ professional responsibility encompasses more than myopic
adherence to the interests of clients and the zealous pursuit of their
adversarial objectives.
Utilization of this standard by courts, however, to qualify
yet-to-be-articulated judicial expectations, like in Sahyers, is neither sound
nor praiseworthy. Rather, its ominous prospect has the potential to
unreasonably compromise counsel’s ability to fulfill legitimate
client-centered obligations. This is certainly not to say, though, that courts
should eschew lofty expectations with regard to the manner in which
counsel comport themselves. Such expectations, particularly in the areas of
civility and collegiality, are a good thing, and courts should continue to
utilize and emphasize attorneys’ roles as officers of the court as a means of
characterizing these ideals.
The only suggestion that this Article makes relates to a preferred
methodology for enforcing a court’s high expectations.258
The
recommended additional step of identifying a specific ethical or procedural
rule as a prerequisite to invocation of the officer-of-the-court standard will
ensure that attorneys have a meaningful opportunity, ex ante, to balance
important client-centered responsibilities against those appropriately owed
to the judicial system, the public, and the profession.

257. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1245 n.5 (11th Cir. 2009) (promoting civility and
collegiality as a method to advance judicial efficiency and promote the public interest), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 415 (2010).
258. See generally supra Part VI (advocating linking existing rules to officer-of-the-court duties).
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